Social Anarchism

nº 24

$4

SOCIAL ANARCHISM 1997 NUMBER 24

Mike Long on Ebonics

Sean Burns on David Wieck

Art Efron on Reading Godwin

John Moore on Dianamania

Reviews by Widmer
Martin
Chorbajian
Packie


WALTHER
MADE IN USA
UNDER LICENSE OF
Carl Walther Waffenfabrik Ulm/Do
Modell PPK/S Cal.9mm kurz/.380ACP

Special Symposium:
An Agenda for Anarchists
Brian Martin
Neala Schluening
Joseph Heathcott
Michael Bacon
Richard Kostelanetz
Howard J. Ehrlich
Peter McGregor
Ronald Creagh

01
7 50644 88603 3



Social Anarchism

A Journal of Theory and Practice

Number 24 • 1997

Social Anarchism

Number 24 • 1997

As both political philosophy and personal lifestyle, social anarchism promotes community self-reliance, direct participation in political decision-making, respect for nature, and nonviolent paths to peace and justice.

Social Anarchism is published by the Atlantic Center for Research and Education, 2743 Maryland Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA. It is distributed by Vacant Lots Press. The journal is issued semi-annually. Social Anarchism Online may be reached at `<http://www.nothingness.org/sociala/>` or you can send email to `sociala@nothingness.org`.

EDITOR

Howard J. Ehrlich

EDITORIAL BOARD

Mark Bevis
Washington, DC

Murray Bookchin
Burlington, VT

Meda Chesney-Lind
Ka'a'awa, HI

David DeLeon
Washington, DC

Vicki Dello Joio
San Francisco, CA

Len Krimerman
Storrs, CT

Elaine Leeder
Ithaca, NY

Ian Lind
Ka'a'awa, HI

Linda Pinkow
Boston, MA

Chris Stadler
Baltimore, MD

Johnson Thomas
Washington, DC

David Westby
University Park, PA

Susan White
Tucson, AZ

Kingsley Widmer
San Diego, CA

ISSN: 0196-4801

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FEATURE

Ebonics, Language and Power 5
Mike Long

SYMPOSIUM: THE ANARCHIST AGENDA

Brian Martin 31
Neala Schleuning 33
Joseph Heathcott 36
Michael Bacon 38
Richard Kostelanetz 40
Peter McGregor 43
Ronald Creagh 44
Howard J. Ehrlich 47

ARCHIVES OF ANARCHY

Reading Political Justice 50
Arthur Efron

IN MEMORIAM

David Thoreau Wieck 59
Sean Burns

ANARCHISTS WRITE 64
John Moore 65
Dianamania

POETRY

Greta Harris 66
Ellen Sander 67
LETTERS 69

REVIEW ESSAY

How Broad and Deep is Anarchism? 77
Kingsley Widmer

REVIEWS

Levon Chorbajian 84
Martin Sprouse, ed.
Sabotage in the American Workplace

Susan Packie 87
Freddie Baer
Ecstatic Incisions

Thomas S. Martin 89
Henry Rosemont, Jr.
A Chinese Mirror

Contributors to this issue 92
Information for Contributors 94

Credits: Cover, typesetting & design: a.h.s. boy/dada typo

Indexed by the Alternative Press Index

Ebonics, language and power

Mike Long <mlong@hawaii.edu>
University of Hawaii

> *Modern education not only corrupts the heart of our youth by the rigid slavery to which it condemns them, it also undermines their reason by the unintelligible jargon with which they are overwhelmed in the first instance, and the little attention that is given to accommodating their pursuits to their capacities in the second.*
>
> William Godwin, *An account of the seminary* (1783), p. 31.

The current furor and confusion in the U.S.A. over the role of Ebonics in education is but a recent skirmish in a long-running struggle. It is not new, not confined to Black English, or to English in general, not confined to education, and certainly not confined to the U.S.A. It is a controversy that surfaces in North America and around the world time and time again. On all five continents, coercive power relationships between socio-economic elites wielding state power and oppressed groups wielding little or none find linguistic reflexes. The elites speak the official state language or the standard variety of a language — in the present case, Standard English (SE) — which *they made* official or standard; the oppressed groups (not necessarily minorities, as in the present case) are decreed by the same elites to speak a less acceptable or unacceptable language or a socially stigmatized variety of the same language, like Black English. Very real objective linguistic differences thus provide yet another excuse for discrimination in many areas of public life, including education, (so-called) criminal justice systems, employment, media access, and even labor unions. The public policy decisions in different countries that result from these periodic convulsions, often enshrined in statute and case law, concern linguistic human rights, and they have wide-ranging social consequences for hundreds of millions of people. The rhetorical barrage surrounding the present struggle serves to confuse the real issues, or to ensure that they are not discussed at all, which benefits only one side in the status quo.

For these reasons and because the role of language in education is but one of several examples of the critical nexus of language and state power, the Ebonics issue is a vital one for working people everywhere. The radical right in the U.S.A.

recognize its importance and have unleashed a distortion-ridden barrage of opinion pieces in the mass media using it to push their own domestic agenda, i.e., a relentless attack on the burgeoning U.S. underclass, spiced with obvious racisim, one manifestation of which is the defunding of public education. Symptomatic of the level of confusion, misinformation and dis-information, at least one supposedly radical left group, the (Trotskyite) International Socialist Organization (U.S. equivalent of the British SWP), has unwittingly aligned itself, albeit for different reasons, with radical conservative demogogues like Rush Limbaugh, Mike Royko, William Raspberry and George Will; the ISO opposes attention to Ebonics because it sees such attention as an irrelevant distraction from the real issues in U.S. education — racism and lack of funding (see, e.g., the editorial and letters section of the January 3rd and 17th issues, respectively, of the ISOs paper, Socialist Worker). And perhaps in reaction to the 300-year denial to African-Americans of access to literacy, education and socio-economic status typically associated with command of SE, usually well-meaning liberals like Kweisi Mfume, Maya Angelou (incensed), Jesse Jackson (ungrammatical English) and Ellen Goodman (legitimizing slang) have come out with reactionary, ill-informed public pronouncements. Some familiarity with the basic linguistic concepts involved and with research findings on (in this case, educational) solutions is required for an informed and appropriately targeted response, and also in order to initiate a long overdue discussion of libertarian approaches to language education and language in education.

Ebonics

Ebonics is a term coined by Robert Williams at a 1973 conference, the proceedings of which, edited by Williams, were published two years later as *Ebonics: The true language of black folks.* He defined it as

> the linguistic and paralinguistic features which on a concentric continuum represent the communicative competence of the West African, Caribbean, and United States idioms, patois, argots, idiolects, and social forces of black people...Ebonics derives its form from ebony (black) and phonics (sound, the study of sound) and refers to the study of the language of black people in all its cultural uniqueness. (1975, p. vi)

The *Journal of Black Studies* devoted a special issue (June, 1979) to Ebonics, but other terms more often employed by linguists are Black English, Black English Vernacular (BEV), and African-American Vernacular English (AAVE). AAVE is the term which will be used here, except when citing those who refer to Ebonics.

The other terms more accurately reflect the fact that we are concerned not just with the sounds, or pronunciation, of Black English, such as final-consonant deletion (*they see him* for they seed him), final consonant cluster reduction (*mos* for most) or th/f substitution (*wif* for with), but with its grammar (morphology and syntax), meaning (lexicon and semantics), and use (discourse and pragmatics), as well. With considerable variation both within and across speakers, common morpho-syntactic differences between AAVE and SE, for example, involve subject-verb agreement (*She like*, *They like*), copula deletion (*They feels as though they even*), past time reference (*He done seen him*), negative inversion (*Dont nobody see*), and double (sometimes even triple) negatives (*I aint never doin that no more*) (see, e.g. Fasold, 1972; Labov, 1972; Wolfram, 1969). There is nothing inferior (or superior) about any of these constructions. If some varieties of AAVE can give expression to an idea about time much earlier than the time of speaking by use of a nifty auxiliary: I *bin* read that book, whereas most white varieties have to use a clumsier adverbial construction, I read that book *a long time ago*, to say the same thing (example courtesy of Ralph Fasold), it is not that AAVE is better or the white varieties worse, just that they are *different*.

The fact that most AAVE speakers are intelligible to speakers of other varieties most of the time, and vice versa, does not alter the fact that some differences do nevertheless cause communication breakdowns and that those can occur without speaker or hearer, e.g., teacher and student, understanding either that or why they have occurred. The late Charlene (Charlie) Sato (1989) showed, moreover, that the *degree* of difference and its import for instruction often go unrecognized, affecting both comprehension and classroom participation in hidden ways. For example, many a SE-speaking immigrant in Hawaii has interpreted Hawaii Creole English (HCE) *neva*, in I *neva see him*, as SE never, instead of what it really means, i.e., didnt, in I didnt see him, *neva* functioning as a past time marker in HCE. Similarly, the African-American child who writes *I be fighting*, which is true, only to have a white SE-speaking teacher correct it to *I am fighting*, which is false, for example (courtesy of Ralph Fasold), is frustrated and confused, and his teacher blissfully unaware of the fact (or the facts).

Dialect differences, Sat (op. cit.) showed, can also often lead to differential participation in classroom interaction, that in turn being interpreted by some teachers as a sign of low academic ability or an attitude problem. To cite but one example, in a study of a first-grade classroom in Berkeley, Michaels (1981) described how a Caucasian teachers own tightly organized topic-centered style, in which thematic development is accomplished through lexical cohesion, the linear ordering of events, and so on, matched that of the white students in her class, but failed to accommodate during the same lesson to her African-American students topic-associating presentational style, with its series of segments or episodes that are implicitly linked in highlighting some person or theme. Familiar prosodic (intonational) features of the white childrens speech, for instance, made it easy for the teacher to time her comments and questions appropriately for them, allowing her to provide successful linguistic scaffolding. Conversely, she appeared to misread stress-placement and vowel-lengthening cues in the black childrens speech, resulting in her disrupting rather than supporting and elaborating on their presentations. (For additional examples of often unrecognized comprehension problems and clashes in interactional style arising from dialect differences in education, see Sato, 1989.)

Numerous linguistic studies of AAVE over the years have documented its richness, expressiveness and communicative adequacy (see, e.g., Labov, 1969, 1995). Like any other natural human language or language variety, AAVE is systematic and rule-governed, its rules sometimes less complex than those of SE, sometimes more so. To illustrate the greater complexity (example courtesy of Ralph Fasold), AAVE offers three tenses (*He thinking about it*, *He be thinking about it*, and *He think about it*) for two in SE in the same domain (*He is thinking about it* and *He thinks about it*), allowing more precision. Those rules and the varieties are, again, not better or worse, just different.

Differences from SE notwithstanding, most linguists do not view AAVE as a separate language (as the original Oakland, California, School Board resolution unfortunately implied, allowing opponents another opening for their attacks), but rather, one of many varieties of English. While there are no hard and fast rules, the usual criterion for distinguishing separate languages from separate varieties of the same language (including geographically, ethnically or social class-based dialects) is mutual intelligibility. If roughly 80% or more of what speaker A says is comprehensible to speaker B, they are usually held to speak different varieties of the same language, not different languages. The issue is a complex one, howwver. For one thing, there are exceptions, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish, for example, being much closer than this, yet referred to as separate languages, probably simply because each today is spoken in a separate country as opposed to within one country. Also, as Strozer (1994, p. 216, fn. 22) points out, the close proximity of such languages as Dutch and German makes it as unjustified to claim that a particular language is better than a particular dialect as to claim that Dutch is better than German or vice versa, or German better than English, and so on. Strozer suggests that it is often more accurate to refer to two varieties of a so-called language, like English, as different languages in their own right. This is not just an ivory tower debate, either. Speaker self-esteem can be affected by being told one is just a dialect speaker, for instance, and governments sometimes fund programs for speakers of different languages, but not of different dialects or other language

It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss negative attitudes towards African-American Vernacular English as simply one more manifestation of racism.

varieties. There is much truth to the often quoted words of the linguist Max Weinreich, A language is a dialect with an army and a navy.

While the language language variety debate continues, there is no doubt over a related issue: which of two or more languages or language varieties is considered the prestige one is not a linguistic issue, but a sociolinguistic one, i.e., a function of the prestige of its speakers. Thus, the stigmatization of AAVE reflects not its linguistic qualities, but negative attitudes towards AAVE *speakers*. For example, it so happens that a number of features of AAVE are also common in several varieties of American English spoken by some whites in southern states, e.g., Arkansas, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and the Carolinas, yet they are not considered problematic when produced by the likes of such fine moral guardians as Bill Clinton, Jimmy Carter, Howell Hefflin, Strom Thurman or Jesse Helms. Similarly, some varieties of so-called standard British English are just as different from standard American English in pronunciation and vocabulary (although not in major systems like verb structure) as standard American English is from AAVE, sometimes more so, yet they rarely elicit the same hostility. For example, most British speakers say *lift*, *boot* and *holiday* for American *elevator*, *trunk* and *vacation*, *Have you got the time?* for *Do you have the time?*, *Have you seen todays paper?* for *Did you see todays paper?*, and so on. Yet many Americans still hold what they wrongly think of as (homogenous) British English in high esteem, higher even than their own variety in some cases. These and numerous other examples that could be cited from around the world show clearly that positive or negative evaluations are not linguistically based; the problem with non-standard varieties lies in the ears and prejudices of the hearers, not the mouths and minds of their speakers.

It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss negative attitudes towards AAVE as simply one more manifestation of racism. While much of the criticism and many of the critics may well be racially motivated, the same stigmatization is often performed by speakers of a standard language or dialect at the expense of speakers of a non-standard one who are members of the same ethnic group. Examples include speakers of standard British English and Cockney English or of restricted and elaborated codes in the U.K. (see below), standard American English and

Appalachian English, high and low German, and standard French and Quebecois or Cajun French. Priviledge, status and authority are at least roughly distributed along racial lines in many societies, including the U.S.A., and are often in turn related to linguistic differences, but it is the *power* to discriminate along racial, linguistic, or any other lines that is the real issue.

Even so-called standard English varies considerably with geography, ethnicity, social class and other factors, as well as over time. Compare, for instance, what is considered SE by elites in New York, California and Alabama, or in India, Australia, Singapore and Nigeria, or in London, Liverpool and Edinburgh. It quickly becomes apparent that the ruling classes (of different ethnic backgrounds, note) in English-speaking countries around the world all have their own peculiar local notions of SE, which always happen to coincide with the way they and their friends speak, and which they proceed to exploit as one more means of discriminating against those who speak differently. In fact, if anything approaching a universal standard variety exists at all, it is found only in the *written* form of English or any other language. Discriminating against people for the way they speak is even more unwarranted than might be obvious to any rational person, for nobody speaks either English or Standard English; *everyone* speaks a variety of English, and SE speakers speak but one *variety* of SE.

The same relationship between language and the power to discriminate determines which variety gets to be called standard and which non-standard. The fact that the answer can change over time as the locus of power changes, even *within* the ruling elites, again belies the notion that there is anything inherently superior or inferior about any one variety. This is true at both the national and international level. It used to be a virtual requirement in the UK, for example, for BBC radio and television news readers and reporters to speak standard British English — something close to the plumb in the mouth accent of Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher that is pervasive on the Tory Party benches to this day. With the election of the Labour Partys Harold Wilson, the first British Prime Minister to speak with a (northern) regional accent, however, a much wider range of regional (and to a lesser extent, social class-based) accents soon became acceptable and perfectly adequate to do the same jobs just as proficiently. British TV and radio today boast accents from most parts of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and of many immigrant groups. Internationally, with the shift in the locus of English-speaking world power from the UK to the U.S.A., the model of English favored for the teaching of English as a foreign language in most countries in Asia and Latin America has shifted from British to American, too. If and when a non-English-speaking country or regional alliance comes to replace the U.S.A. as the dominant world power, English itself will eventually give way. By the end of the next century, it may be Mandarin Chinese that everyone is learning. If so, it will not be because Chinese is superior to English, any more than English is superior now. It will simply, again, be a question of power.

Language and identity

AAVE is the variety of American English, itself taking several distinct forms, that is spoken by many, but by no means all, African-Americans, particularly, but not only, in the inner cities, as well as by a few other groups in the U.S.A., such as some southeast Asian refugees who grew up in African-American neigborhoods. AAVE is usually identified with the race and ethnicity of its speakers, but many African-Americans, especially members of the black middle-classes, seldom experience it as children, and others do so but choose not to speak it, or do so only rarely and only in certain settings in which they consider its use appropriate. AAVE is better seen as not simply a matter of race, therefore, but of social class, and to some degree also of age, for it tends to be especially strong and salient among the young urban poor. Among black youth, linguists have found evidence of AAVEs increasing divergence from standard(i.e., currently mostly white, middle-class) spoken American English, especially in its pronunciation and intonation, apparently as a marker of group solidarity and resistance (see, e.g., Bailey, 1987; 1993; Bailey and Maynor, 1989; Labov and Harris, 1986).

The same trend was reported by Sato (1991) among adolescents in Hawaii. Most Hawaiian children, like (this time) the *majority* of people who grow up in the Hawaiian Islands, especially those from working-class backgrounds and educated in public schools, are speakers of another non-standard (albeit, this time, again, *majority*) variety, Hawaii Creole English (HCE), often referred to locally as Pidgin. Paralleling disputes over AAVE, the status of HCE in Hawaiis classrooms has also been the subject of a long, continuing struggle (see Sato, 1985). HCE is currently experiencing something of an upswing through the increasing productivity of fine local poets, novelists, dramatists and lyricists, like Joe Balaz, Eric Chock, Richard Hamasaki, Rodney Morales, Wai-Tek Lim and Lois-Ann Yamanaka, many published through Bamboo Ridge Press, who write at least partly in HCE, often about the everyday lives of local working-class families. HCEs persistence and vibrancy, along with increasingly positive attitudes to it among its speakers, especially Hawaiian youth, seems to reflect its perceived desirability as a marker of local identity and resistance to economic and social oppression, including in recent years, resistance to comical attempts by Hawaiis educational bureaucrats and politicians to eradicate HCE from the schools. Most locals, i.e., those born and raised in the Islands, experience discrimination every day at the hands of (this time) the *minority* of standard English-speakers, most of whom are *haole* (outsiders, typically Caucasians). It is the *haole*, together with Japanese corporations, who dominate the grossly exploitative tourist industry, which accounts for about 35% of all jobs and wealth in the fiftieth state. With Sato our most articulate and expert spokesperson, a coalition of applied linguists, linguists and graduate students from the University of Hawaii, public school teachers and children, local artists, and several Wobblies, among others, helped organize strong, at least partly successful community-based resistance to the State Legislatures and Hawaii Board of Educations assault on HCE in 1987, as well as (ultimately unsuccessfully) for a major court case the same year (Kahakua et al. v. Hallgren), which involved accent discrimination against HCE speakers in the workplace (see Sato, 1991, for an account of both struggles).

To sum up so far, AAVE, like HCE and like language everywhere, is an important part of peoples identity. To attack a language or language variety by discriminating against it in education, e.g., by forcing students to be educated through someone elses language or language variety, is to attack its speakers. It is an effective way of breaking down resistance and of rendering communities and cultures more vulnerable to state control. As the current rapid spread of English as a vehicle for international capitalism worldwise illustrates, the spread of an official language or standard language variety increases the influence of its existing speakers, and facilitates absorption of new ones into an English-speaking (especially, now, U.S. capitalist) world view. Linguistic dependency quickly translates into political, economic and cultural dependency, or as Pennycook (1995) puts it, English in the world quickly becomes the world in English.

Governments know all this. It is no accident that, as part of the fascist dictatorships brutal suppression of the Basques and Catalans after 1939, Franco made it illegal to speak Basque or Catalan and an imprisonable offense to teach them, or that the indigenous Hawaiian language (now being revived through school immersion programs) was suppressed by the plantation owners and missionaries to the point of extinction, or that the same politicians, e.g., Dole and Gingrich, and forces behind current movements to make English the (only) official language of the U.S.A. are those on the wrong side of every other struggle for social justice, or that Israel obliges Arabic-speaking university students to take their classes and exams in Hebrew (despite Arabic being an official language in Israel), or that the U.S.A., Britain, France, Germany, and now Japan, consider it so important to spend so much (of other peoples) time and money on teaching their national languages overseas. When then U.S. Vice-President Dan Quayle, not renowned for his own language abilities, made a speech urging thousands of young Americans to join the Peace Corps to go and teach English to the newly liberated citizens of Hungary, Rumania, and elsewhere in eastern Europe, was it because of a sudden interest in foreign language learning on his part?

What is true of languages is true of language varieties. Governments and elites understand the gatekeeping opportunities afforded them by support of a standard variety as a requirement for access to power. The fact that discrimination against speakers of other languages and of non-standard dialects is often carried out by people of the *same* race, upper-class against working-class and/or regional dialect-speaking white children in Germany and the UK, for example, shows that the issue is fundamentally one of power, not race. As noted earlier, while power imbalances are often strongly correlated with racial differences, as in the present U.S. case, it would be a mistake to view the attack on Ebonics as *simply* another manifestation of racism, as some have done, and to lose sight of the vital linguistic issues in the process. Racism and underfunding may be more crucial than language matters in public education in the U.S.A. overall, but as explained earlier, there is ample independent evidence of the importance of linguistic discrimination in education for African-Americans and for many white children, too. Hence, the addition of linguistic discrimination — or what has been termed linguicism (Phillipson, 1992; Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson and Rannut, 1995; Tollefson, 1995) — to racism, sexism, and the long list of other forms of oppression experienced by working people may be acceptable to politicians, corporations, right-wing ideologues, media barons, some prominent liberals, and other representatives of state power, but it is surely unacceptable to those who value individual freedom and diversity of all kinds, including linguistic diversity, and who oppose any manifestation of state coercion. Gratifyingly, as shown by the case of Hawaii (where HCE is still very much under siege, nonetheless), and several African-American communities in the U.S.A., among others, it is increasingly unacceptable to a growing number of working people themselves.

The Oakland School Board resolution

According to a January 15, 1997, article in *Education Week*, approximately 53% of the 52,300 K-12 student population in the Oakland, California, School District is black, and 47% Asian or Latino. There are very few white students. A plurality of the teaching staff is white, the next largest group black. Oakland teachers had not had a raise in five years, and in February, 1996, went on a two-month strike over pay and conditions, especially class size, black and white teachers standing shoulder to shoulder on the picket lines. They won a partial victory over wages, but little else. The schools themselves, like public schools almost everywhere in the U.S.A., are underfunded and run down. Student test scores are low and getting worse; of the 28,000 black students, 71% are in special education classes, 64% held back a grade, and on a four-point scale, their collective grade point average is a meagre 1.8.

Against this background, on December 18th, 1996, the seven-member Oakland School Board unanimously adopted a resolution recognizing Ebonics as a legitimate genetically based (sic) language spoken by many of its African-American students, and proposing to seek state and federal funds in order to mount additional training programs. (Some programs, costing $200,000 a year in state and federal funding, were already in effect for 3,000 students in the District). Their purpose was not, as has often been asserted, to teach Ebonics (which the students already know, after all), but initially to accept classroom participation *in* Ebonics, while pointing out differences between Ebonics and SE to the children, as the resolution clearly stated for the combined purposes of maintaining the legitimacy and richness of such language . . . and to facilitate [African-American students] acquisition and mastery of English-language skills. Like the reportedly successful five-year Ebonics program in the Dallas public schools recently shut down due to funding cuts, the Oakland resolutions first objective was to help sensitize teachers to linguistic differences between AAVE and Standard English (SE). On a par with programs designed to help immigrants who speak a different language to learn English, the second aim was to help AAVE speakers learn SE, and to do so without denigrating or (as if this were possible by fiat) eradicating the home (AAVE) variety. The third goal was to *begin* instruction in reading, maths, etc. in AAVE, on the usually unchallenged pedagogic principle of starting where the students are, and then gradually making the transition to SE. Subsequent public comments by School Board members suggested that the resolution was an honest, well-intentioned (not to mention, for the most part scientifically supportable) attempt to do something tangible to help a large group of under-achieving students in their care.

A few voices were raised publicly in support of the general thrust, at least, of the Boards proposal during the weeks that followed, including that of the countrys preeminent professional association for linguists, the Linguistics Society of America (LSA), which at the end of its annual conference, fortuitously meeting in Chicago early in January, 1997, issued a formal resolution broadly supportive of the Oakland initiative. The LSA resolution stressed AAVEs well documented rule-governed systematicity, appending a list of nearly 30 scientific books on the subject, noted that the distinction between language and dialect is usually made more on social and political than linguistic grounds, and described recent public characterizations of Ebonics as slang, mutant, lazy, defective, ungrammatical, and broken English as incorrect and demeaning. The resolution further noted evidence from Sweden, the U.S.A. and other countries to the effect that pedagogical approaches which recognize the legitimacy of non-standard varieties of a language help their speakers learn the standard variety, and concluded that the Oakland School Boards decision to recognize the vernacular of African-American students in teaching them Standard English is linguistically and pedagogically sound. A resolution to expand language programs for African-American students was introduced in January by a member of the Los Angeles School Board, the second largest in the U.S.A.

Supporters, however, were simply overwhelmed by an immediate and intense barrage of angry, often blatantly racist, sometimes close to hysterical, criticism from all sides. Different interest groups singled out different aspects of the resolution, parts of which really were open to criticism because they were linguistically uninformed or poorly communicated. With hardly a pause for breath, let alone unwanted debate or hearings on the real issue, and obviously relieved at the easy out the resolution allowed his agency, U.S. Department of Education Secretary Richard W. Riley quickly issued a statement saying USDOE would certainly not be funding any education programs for AAVE speakers or their teachers, since, contrary to what the Oakland resolution had stated, Ebonics was not a separate language — about which, since (with the caveats noted above) it is simply one *variety* of English, the USDOE was arguably right. Others reacted negatively to the idea that Ebonics, or any other language, was genetically based, and in this, too (see below), they were right, while managing to avoid the real issue.

For numerous right-wing commentators with their usual surfeit of air-time in the mainstream media (often their own regular newspaper columns and whole TV shows), a common approach was simply to assert that support for Ebonics was an unfounded, minority, liberal position, just one more dangerous example of divisive Afrocentrism, and then quickly to lose the original language-in-education issue amidst a melange of baseless, sweeping charges about European civilization and white history and culture being under threat in the curriculum. Aristotle was Greek and white, for instance, but how many students learned that at school, an irrate George Will demanded to know within minutes of the start of an early ABC current affairs debate supposedly on Ebonics. To make matters worse, the ideologues task was facilitated by the shield provided them in the form of the strong condemnations of the Oakland resolution issued by prominent Black liberals, notably Maya Angelou, who had credibility as the U.S. poet laureate. Such pronouncements on the issue were given exceptionally good media coverage. For instance, perhaps because of his increasingly more reactionary political stances on a number of issues in recent years, the Reverend Jesse Jackson is often sought out and presented by mainstream journalists as if he were an official spokesperson for all African-Americans; meanwhile, more radical (although often equally reactionary) African-American leaders with large followings, such as the Reverend Louis Farakhan, are marginalized.

The scent of blood in their nostrils, politicians in Massachusetts and Virginia introduced bills to prohibit the teaching of Ebonics in public schools (something the Oakland resolution had not suggested), and to make Standard English Virginias official language, and a Republican congressman from New York, Peter King, introduced a bill to prohibit the use of federal funds to support any program that is based on the premise that ebonics is a legitimate language. It is no coincidence that King is an activist in another currently hot area of state encroachment on linguistic human rights in the U.S.A., the heavily corporate-funded English-only movement, in which he is one of many federal politicians backing legislation to make English the official language of government and to abolish bilingual education programs. This is an initiative which, were it successful, would severely damage the educational life chances of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of already disadvantaged immigrant children who are speakers or would-be speakers of English as a second language, just as the current lack of equivalent programs for AAVE speakers and others damages the educational life chances of many African-Americans, Latinos, and other speakers of SE as a second dialect. These groups of second language and second dialect speakers are heavily over-represented among low-skilled workers. Unluckily for them, they consititute a sector which, outside of some service industries, is increasingly irrelevant to business (hence, government) interests following corporate flight to alternative supplies of more easily exploited and far cheaper labor in the third world. This makes the strong legislative and corporate support for such measures as English-only, and their lack of support for language in education programs, understandable, although no less reprehensible.

Faced with the media onslaught, on January 15th the Oakland School Board unanimously adopted a somewhat modified version of their original resolution. While continuing to maintain (most would say, falsely) that Ebonics is not a dialect of English, and stating (arguably correctly) that some linguistic features of Ebonics (although probably only a few lexical items) have their origins in West African and Niger-Congo languages, references to Ebonics as genetically based were removed. The earlier call to have children educated in their primary language, Ebonics, was also modified to clarify the intention of the original resolution, i.e., for education to begin where children were at linguistically — an uncontroversial proposition in any other aspect of education — and to move them towards SE over time.

As should be obvious by now, however, the details and fate of the Oakland resolutions themselves are not the real issue. If the Oakland initiative is stymied and eventually goes away, as currently (February, 1997) seems likely, the critical role of language and of language varieties in education will not. It is useful, therefore, to continue the debate (and this article) a little further in the hope that our own response can be that much better informed and ready to go whenever and wherever the language police strike next, as they assuredly will, as well as for the purpose of stimulating long overdue discussion among those more seriously interested in libertarian approaches to both language education and language in education. The remainder of this paper is intended as no more than a very brief, very preliminary contribution to that discussion. At this juncture, it addresses the issues from an admittedly reactive, defensive stance, situated in the current socio-political context, as that is what faces education workers now. A fuller, more constructive and more interesting treatment will need to presuppose highly complex future societies like those most of us live in today, but societies organized on egalitarian lines, where individual freedom will be cherished, where linguistic oppression, and even linguistic genocide, will no longer be issues to be confronted, but where the role of language in education will always be important since, as Marshall (1986, p. 40) put it, freedom is the basis of education and education is the basis of freedom. A useful place to start, given the critical relevance of each to the current debate, is with a sketch of (i) the relationship between genetics and the environment in language and language learning, and (ii) educational options for unofficial or non-standard language or dialect school-age populations.

Nature and nurture in language

In sharp contrast to neo-behaviorist views of language learning, which were largely demolished by Chomskys devastating review of B.F.Skinners *Verbal Behavior* (Chomsky, 1959), most modern theorists — not least, Chomsky himself — posit a critical role for biology in language acquisition, and a much less important one for the linguistic environment. Such views are broadly consistent with several widely observed phenomena. (i) While a few complex grammatical constructions can remain problematic into the early teens, normal children have developed sufficient knowledge of the grammar, lexicon and sound system of whichever language(s) they hear around them to carry on conversations with ease by age five. This is an astonishing feat, although one that often goes unnoticed for being the norm. Children accomplish it at an age when most of them still have trouble with far simpler psychomotor and cognitive tasks, like tying their shoelaces, kicking a soccer ball, doing simple addition, or drawing a plan of their house. (ii) *All* normal children are successful, and at roughly the same age, regardless of substantial differences in IQ which affect their achievement on other *non*-linguistic tasks, and despite substantial variation in home linguistic environment, child-rearing patterns, cultural setting and (at least surface) structural differences in the languages being learned. (iii) Even some severely mentally retarded children, e.g., Turners Syndrome cases, manage relatively normal morphology and syntax (but not semantics). (iv) Despite having been successful with language learning as children, which principles of transfer of training would indicate should help them with similar tasks later, people trying to learn new languages as adults often do very poorly, even when — like many, but not all immigrants — they are motivated, intelligent, and have plenty of opportunity. In fact, recent research findings suggest that mastery of foreign or second languages at the same level as native speakers of those languages appears to require that first exposure to the L2 occur before age six if a perfect accent is ever to be hoped for, and by the mid-teens for native-like morphology and syntax (for review, see Long, 1990, 1993).

Observations like these combine to suggest the existence of a powerful, innate human learning capacity — one which dissociation data like those on Turners children suggest is language-specific (i.e., separate from general learning abilities) and modular — and one which is biologically programmed to operate optimally on a maturational schedule within the bounds of one or more so-called sensitive periods. Chomsky put it this way:

> Acquisition of language is something that happens to you; its not something that you do. Language learning is something like undergoing puberty. You dont learn to do it; you dont do it because you see other people doing it; you are designed to do it at a certain time. (Chomsky, 1988, 173-174)

It is clear that every child, whatever their ethnic or social class origins, is born with the same innate capacity to learn whichever language(s) he or she is exposed to, to do so at a very young age, and to do so remarkably fast. There is some evidence that children first exposed to a second dialect of a language after age six, like those first attempting second language acquisition after that age, are unable to master the new variety to native-like standards, with the prognosis deteriorating markedly for those first exposed as teenagers, and with morpho-syntax also problematic for starters older than the mid-teens (see, e.g. Chambers, 1992). If second dialect acquisition really is subject to the same putative maturational constraints that seem to affect second language acquisition, the linguistic flexibility routinely demanded of ethnolinguistic minority school children is even more discriminatory than previously thought. Similarly, requiring a radical change of accent by adults for certain kinds of employment could be demanding the biologically impossible and so constitute a violation of civil rights law in some countries, although, of course, one that few courts are likely to recognize, whatever the merits, for fear of the socio-economic consequences of offering legal protection for the linguistic rights of people other than those which judicial systems primarily serve to protect.

This much is due to nature. *Which* language(s) or language varieties are learned during this period, conversely, is determined by nurture, i.e., the linguistic environment. In other words, it is the ability and timetable for acquiring language that is genetically based, not the languages themselves. Caucasian or African-American children born to English-speaking parents in Chicago will learn whatever varieties of English they hear spoken around them, principally those of their parents, other caretakers and age peers. A child of whatever ethnicity born to a linguistically mixed couple can learn both languages (say English and Spanish) if both are used with him or her sufficiently, although overwhelming exposure to one of them outside the home often leads to that language being dominant, or to the childs ability in it being stronger. Any of those children whose family suddenly moves early enough to an environment where another language is spoken will learn that second or third language (say German or Japanese) instead of, or in addition to, English and/or Spanish, given sufficient exposure. The genetic inheritance for language acquisition is equal and universal, regardless of the social class origins or ethnicity of the child, and regardless of the language or language variety in the environment.

On the basis of facts like these, as well as the discovery of a more controversial set of putative structural universals in human languages (so-called Universal Grammar), and the alleged impossibility of accomplishing a task as complex as language acquisition so quickly and *only* by listening to the input, Chomsky has been prominent in arguing, further, and very influentially, that what is innate is not *just* the language-learning capacity, but the capacity *plus* substantive knowledge of those universal grammatical principles and of the restricted ways in which languages may vary. Children are born already knowing the underlying properties of human *language*, from this persepective; they are successful so uniformly and so quickly because all they have to do is to tune in to the particular language or languages — English, Spanish, Farsi, Arabic, etc. — being used around them, the basic properties of which they already know at some level, register the particular ways those principles are realized in the language they are hearing, and master its vocabulary and pragmatics, plus the discourse conventions and cultural norms of its speakers by observing the behavior of those around them — language socialization. Children do not learn their native language, from this perspective; rather, it unfolds. Language learning is even more heavily a function of nature, on this view, with nurture and the environment (linguistic input) again simply determining which particular languages are learned. There are several rival linguistic theories and accounts of child language acquisition, but successive formulations of Chomskys position have remained highly influential for over 30 years.

Language acquisition is thus a product of both nature and nurture. Every child comes into the world innately equipped to learn one or more languages. Members of any particular ethnic group are not genetically programed to speak a particular language or language variety, but, rather, whichever one(s) they are exposed to early enough. An important corrollary of this for the Ebonics debate is that *every* language or language variety is a reflection of the same human capacity, and as such, inevitably of equal communicative potential. This is the case regardless of any differences two languages or varieties of a language may exhibit at any one point in time in such areas as their technical vocabulary for discussing the colors of tropical foliage, personal computers or Sumo wrestling, and of course, regardless of their current *social* prestige.

Educational options

As indicated above, if all but a few severely mentally abnormal children are genetically endowed with the same (species-specific) capacity for language learning, it follows that the particular language, e.g., English, or variety of a language, e.g., AAVE, which they end up speaking must have the same inherent communicative potential and, at some deep level, the same fundamental linguistic properties as any other, notwithstanding surface differences among them. There is no justification for equating non-standard with sub-standard, therefore, no justification for assessing childrens intellectual ability from the way they speak, and no scientific basis to the idea that linguistic differences are genetically based or indicative of different scholastic potential.

The same fundamental linguistic qualities and communicative potential, notwithstanding, it is clear that languages and language varieties can differ in potential and prestige *at any one time* (Hymes, 1992). While that is due to the power and prestige of those who speak them, not to any inherent superiority of the systems themselves, the fact remains that in a hierarchically organized society, access not only to power, but to freedom and control over peoples own lives can often depend at least in part on language. Linguistic differences provide ruling elites with one more gatekeeping mechanism by which to deny access to power. Accent, speech style or command of a prestige language variety can determine success or failure in employment (Sato, 1991), guilt or innocence in court (Eades, 1992, 1994), and — of primary concern in the Ebonics debate — self-esteem and achievement in school.

The importance of home-to-school language switch has long been documented in numerous countries. The vast majority of children throughout the world enter primary school with at least some degree of mis-match between what they have grown used to linguistically by listening to their caretakers and playmates in and around the home and the language of schooling. In many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, children have to learn a new language if they want any formal education at all, and sometimes a third language in order to continue on to secondary or tertiary education. The fact that *some* of those children succeed both in mastering the language(s) required, and with their education, does not make the task less of an imposition; nor does it compensate for the vast numbers of others who fail at both or do less well because of the extra linguistic burden with which they are confronted.

Where *varietal* disjunctions are concerned, the British sociologist of language, Basil Bernstein (1971 and elsewhere), drew widespread attention to the educational impact of differences between what he described as the restricted code spoken by most working-class British children on entry to school, itself a function, he said, of the traditional positional structure of most British working-class families (No more ice-cream because I said so), on the one hand, and on the other, the elaborated code (No more ice-cream because if you eat more now, you wont want your dinner later) spoken by most middle-class children, which was the language of teachers and of schooling. It was largely that linguistic difference, he claimed, which accounted for the staggering and tragic, persistent educational failure of working-class children, including their frequent failure even to complete secondary education. While subsequent studies showed that the codes themselves may not be linguistically more or less complex than one another, few linguists or educators have challenged Bernsteins basic claim about the importance of the disjunction itself. (For a recent exposition of his views, and responses to some of his critics, see Bernstein, 1996.) Rather, applied linguists have described the impact of analogous cases in public education around the world (see, e.g., Malcolm, 1994, on Aboriginal English in Australian schools; McGroarty, 1991, on ethnolinguistic minority dialects in the U.S.A.; and Sato, 1985, 1989, 1991, on HCE in Hawaii). In all such settings, several alternatives exist for educators. While particular local situations often require unique solutions, some general principles and broad options can be distinguished.

With varying degrees of subtlety, the usual solution favored by states everywhere is *submersion* in the official language or prestige standard dialect as soon as children enter school. This favors the children of parents who speak the language or dialect concerned, disfavors those who do not, and increases the likelihood of linguistic, political and cultural *assimilation* of groups, such as immigrants or racial blocks, which, left linguistically intact, might eventually threaten the hegemony of current elites.

Submersion programs should not be confused with the widely successful *immersion* programs, like French immersion for English-speaking Canadians, in which children who speak the dominant national language, English, receive all or part of their curriculum delivered through the other official, but minority, language, French (their L2), and, as evaluation studies show, typically graduate with a good command of French (comparable to native speakers in listening and reading, less good in speaking and writing), with no adverse effects on their achievement in other subjects. In immersion, all students start as a linguistically and educationally homogeneous group, usually as beginners, making it possible for teachers to adapt their (L2 French) speech appropriately and keep content instruction comprehensible. In submersion, on the other hand, non-English-speaking or limited English-speaking children are thrown in with English-speaking children in English-medium classrooms. The speech they hear around them is initially incomprehensible because addressed primarily to children who already speak English, making it difficult for the non-native speakers to learn either the language or the subject matter being taught through it. Submersion programs are also known as sink or swim. Countless immigrant and other linguistic minority children sink (see, e.g., Schinke-Llano, 1983). These are the programs favored by the English-only movements.

Slightly less obviously coercive are various kinds of *transition* models, which allow use of the home language or dialect in the early stages, but quickly introduce the official language or standard variety, and move children from one to the other, such that the home language or dialect is replaced by the new one, a process known as *subtractive bilingualism* (adding the second language, but losing the first). In theory, for example, so-called transitional, or early-exit, bilingual education programs in some parts of the U.S.A. allow classroom use of Spanish for some subjects, while gradually introducing English for others, from the first one to three years of school, after which Spanish is dropped. In practice, studies show, Spanish, the most widely spoken minority language in the U.S.A., is rarely used or survives even that long in such programs. The fate of less commonly spoken languages is even worse.

Much more respectful of linguistic rights, as well as of students identities and cultural backgrounds, are models which seek to add the second language or dialect while validating and preserving the first, so-called *maintenance* bilingual programs. Examples include what are known in the U.S.A. as late-exit bilingual education programs, which, in theory, allow classroom use of Spanish (or some other L1) for up to the first six years of schooling, while gradually introducing English in selected subjects, before transitioning to English. These programs aim to maintain the students first language and add the second, i.e., *additive bilingualism*, graduating bilinguals, not monolingual L2 English speakers. Continuation of Hawaiian for the first six years of the fledgling Hawaiian state school immersion programs, and for K through 12 in one of them, was recently approved after intense pressure and not a little direct action on the part of parents, Hawaiian activists and their supporters. In practice, unfortunately, true maintenance programs are extremely rare, as it seems there is a vast difference between rhetoric and practice when it comes to school boards providing the money, curriculum materials and personnel to implement true six-year maintenance bilingual education.

Evaluation research in this area has been scant and often of poor quality, but a five-year, three-way comparative study (Ramirez, 1992; Ramirez et. al., 1991) of (i) early-exit and (ii) late-exit Spanish bilingual programs, and (iii) programs for Spanish-speakers that were English-medium from the outset, at 27 sites around the U.S.A. found fairly consistent positive relationships between the length of time classroom Spanish use continued and childrens eventual attainment in other subjects, including reading, maths *and* the L2, English. The Ramirez et. al. study and others suggest that bilingual education can work quite well, yet it is precisely bilingual programs, and especially maintenance bilingual programs — which have hardly ever been given a chance to show what they can do — that are under attack from the English-only forces and the likes of Gingrich, Dole and Buchanan, as part of the more general onslaught on immigrants, ethnolinguistic minorities, and public education in the U.S.A. and elsewhere. A parallel attack is currently well under way in Australia. The widely admired, well-informed, and socially progressive Australian Language Policy (LoBianco, 1987), which championed (indigenous) Aboriginal and (immigrant) heritage language rights, and supported multilingualism and multiculturalism, was gutted and — with the surprising exception of continued support, in theory, at least, for Aboriginal languages — replaced by something approaching an English-only policy when it was rewritten in 1991 by a team of federal bureaucrats. The bureaucrats, it should be noted by those still seduced by labor parties (an oxymoron), were working commissioned directly by the Minister of Education of the ALP (Australian Labor Party) Hawke/Keating regime, not the current (blatantly) right-wing Howard (Liberal Party) government, which is simply finishing the job.

A general methodological principle, noted earlier, that is apparent in the relatively successful immersion and bilingual programs is that a good teacher or educational program starts where the students are. This is not questioned in the case of subject matter instruction. Few people would suggest trying to teach the tennis serve before the forehand, multiplication before addition, or cardiac surgery before anatomy. The same principle applies with language. There is a vast body of literature documenting the way caretakers (typically parents and elder siblings) adapt their speech and/or conversation to the current linguistic abilities of children acquiring their first language, and then, while conversing with them at their level and thereby making *what* they say comprehensible, simultaneously provide them with models of *how* to say it in an increasingly native-like, adult manner. The same phenomena have repeatedly been observed in child and adult second language acquisition (for review, see Long, 1996). In a very real sense, in other words, if given the opportunity, people of all ages use their innate language-acquisition capacity to learn languages by using what they know so far to try to communicate, and in the process learn a little more. As Hatch (1978, p. 404) put it, language learning evolves *out of* learning how to carry on conversations.

Starting where the students are is essentially what the Oakland resolution proposed. Quite apart from the above rationale for doing so, there is a fair amount of evidence (although not nearly as much or as good evidence as one would like) of the effectiveness of the same principle applied to education through a second dialect. Simkins and Simkins (1980), for example, compared reading gains by 530 AAVE-speaking children, grades 7 through 12, in 21 classes in five parts of the U.S.A. using Houghton-Mifflins three-stage *Bridge* reading program (see Labov, 1995, for a useful critique of these and other reading materials) with gains by AAVE students in six classes using traditional SE materials in remedial reading classes. The treatment group first learned to read using a text written in AAVE, then a transitional reader, and finally a SE reader. The average gain in reading scores for students in the bridge program was 6.2 months for the four months of instruction. The control group students gained only 1.6 months in the same period. It should be noted, however, that there were several methodological problems with the study, which unfortunately was suspended after four months, in any case, due to the objections of some African-American community members, among other things, to the use of different curricula for black and white children.

After reviewing work by Boggs, Watson-Gegeo, Speidel and others documenting a wide variety of dialect-based problems in the classroom, Sato (1989) went on to describe several programs, such as those in the Kamehameha [Schools] Early Education Program (KEEP), that have been used with children in Hawaii and elsewhere to address both the comprehension and classroom participation problems arising from both dialect differences and differences in teachers and students interactional styles. The latter involve such phenomena as culturally based differences in the significance of pauses and silence in talk, notions of precision and relevance, an orientation towards trusted peers rather than adult authority figures, a preference for cooperation rather than competition, the function and interpretation of various kinds of questions, and the perceived appropriateness of various kinds of responses (e.g., direct or indirect) to those questions. These and many other linguistic differences affect comprehension, participation patterns and learning in classrooms, but are important far beyond classrooms, of course. Eades (1992, 1995 and elsewhere), for example, has shown how they are also differences which have cost Aboriginal defendants dearly in Australian courts on more than one occasion.

The problems, Sato argued, must first be recognised and understood. They can then be addressed successfully at a variety of levels, both inside and outside the classroom. What is called for, however, she wrote,

> is not simply consciousness-raising, that is, informing teachers about sociolinguistic diversity....The bureaucracy of the school system itself should be analyzed....Working in organizations such as teachers unions and parent-teacher associations can also lead to a more sympathetic treatment of minority schooling issues. A recent controversy in Hawaii over the State Board of Educations proposed English Only policy [see Sato, 1991] illustrates how effective collective action by teachers, students, parents and researchers can be against reactionary views toward sociolinguistic diversity. (Sato, 1989, p. 276-77)

Overall, where educational outcomes turn partly on differences in varieties of a language, Sato advocated models where childrens home variety, e.g., HCE or AAVE, is validated and preserved, while a second — usually standard — variety is added, to graduate students who command two, or in practice, a range of speech levels and styles, and whose attainment in content areas will not have been impeded by instruction that was delivered from the outset through a variety that was initially unfamiliar to them. If additive bilingualism, as in the case of French immersion programs in Canada, is a worthy linguistic and educational goal for the children of dominant language groups, why not this approach for the children of Oakland, Hawaii and elsewhere? Satos recommendations eight years ago are just as apt today:

> It has been argued that understanding of the political context of teaching SESD [standard English as a second dialect] and greater familiarity with differences in varieties and the classroom experiences of minority students are necessary for both policy making and pedagogy. The nonstandard approach to the teaching of SESD advocated here takes as fundamental (a) the social and linguistic integrity of minority varieties of English and, therefore, (b) the need to design sociolinguistically appropriate pedagogy for speakers of such varieties. Rather than remediation of students language and replacement of minority varieties with proper English, the teaching of SESD may prove more successful if systematically practiced as additive bidialectalism.(Sato, 1989, pp. 276-77, emphasis added)

A broader debate

As indicated earlier, the above discussion is not only preliminary, but has been conducted within the stifling constraints entailed in the continued existence of imperialist nation states, whether monopoly capitalist or authoritarian socialist. Many current problems with language in education around the world are epiphenomena, nasty by-products of such things as the need of states everywhere for national unity (i.e., acceptance of the status quo, or their legitimacy), one manifestation of which is a fear of linguistic diversity among their own (or increasingly, the worlds) peoples. The useful gatekeeping function of official languages and standard dialects for those wielding state power, likewise, has already been noted. Hierarchical power structures, centralized authority and state control over (compulsory) education systems are among the mechanisms which make state-mandated violations of students and teachers identities and language rights possible in the first place. State coercion, often in the form of punishment and failure at school, and ultimately involving brute force and imprisonment in some countries, is what sanctions the discriminatory language policies. Likewise, some proposed solutions advocated within the same restricted terms of reference are equally clearly illusory. Struggles to force governments, or even the United Nations, to recognize linguistic human *rights*, for instance, as the Israeli, Australian, and many other far worse cases show, are really no more than struggles for just as easily revokable, temporary *licenses*, and simultaneously serve to legitimize states as the arbiters in such matters, when it is governments that are often the problem, not the solution.

What is needed among those seriously interested in language issues, in education, and in areas where the two intersect, is a far broader debate than has been initiated here. For example, what are the general principles which underlie libertarian educational theory and practice? There is a rich anarchist intellectual tradition in education, found among *many* other places, in the writings and practice of Godwin, Tolstoy, Bakunin, Morris, Fourier, Michel, Faure, Robin, Kropotkin, Ferrer y Guardia, Puig Elias, Cohen, Goldman, Holt, Illich, Duane and Ward. Is that tradition adequate for tomorrows complex multilingual, multicultural societies, industrial or otherwise, or are areas of it, at least, in need of updating? What are the lessons to be learned from practical implementations of anarchist ideas about education in different countries, some of which have been described and analyzed in a number of valuable recent books and articles (see, e.g., Avrich, 1980; Shotton, 1993; Smith, 1987; Spring, 1975; Ward, 1995; and Wright, 1989; articles in *The Raven* Nos. 10 and 16, and in *Lib Ed*)? In sum, would most problems of linguistic human rights, in education and elsewhere, simply disappear with the advent of voluntary communities, *l'education integrale*, a radically learner-centered educational symbiosis of mental and manual work, voluntary schooling, informal education, control of their workplaces by education workers (including students) and their industrial unions, and other promises of anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism, or might there still be at least a few problems in paradise?

References

Avrich, P. (1980) *The modern school movement. Anarchism and education in the United States*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bailey, G. (1987) Decreolization? *Language and Society* 16, 449-473.

Bailey, G. (1993) A perspective on African-American English. In D.Preston (Ed.), *American dialect research* (pp. 287-318). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Bailey, G. and Maynor, N. (1989) The divergence controversy. *American Speech* 64, 12-39.

Bernstein, B. (1971) *Class, codes and control*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bernstein, B. (1996) *Pedagogy, symbolic control and identity. Theory, research, critique*. London: Taylor and Francis.

Chambers, J.K. (1992) Dialect acquisition. *Language* 68, 4, 673-698.

Chomsky, N. (1959) Review of Verbal Behavior by B.F.Skinner. *Language* 35, 26-58.

Chomsky, N. (1988) *Language and Problems of knowledge. The Managua lectures*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Eades, D. (1992) *Aboriginal English and the law*. Brisbane: Queensland Law Society.

Eades, D. (1994) A case of communicative clash: Aboriginal English and the legal system. In J.Gibbons (Ed.), *Language and the law* (pp. 234-264). London: Longman.

Fasold, R. (1972) *Tense marking in Black English*. Arlington, VA: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Hatch, E.M. (1978) Discourse analysis and second language acquisition. In E.M.Hatch (Ed.), *Second language acquisition: A book of readings* (pp. 401-435). Rowley, MA: Newbury House.

Hymes, D. (1992) Inequality in language: Taking for granted. *Working Papers in Educational Linguistics* (University of Pennsylvania) 8, 1,1-30.

Labov, W. (1969) The logic of non-standard English. *Georgetown Monographs on Language and Linguistics* 22. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Center for Applied Linguistics.

Labov, W. (1972) *Language in the inner city*. Phildelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Labov, W. (1995) Can reading failure be reversed? A linguistic approach to the question. In Gadsden and D.Wagner (Eds.), *Literacy among African-American youth*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press..

Labov, W. and Harris, W.A. (1986). De facto segregation of black and white vernaculars. In D.Sankoff (Ed.), *Diversity and diachrony* (pp. 45-58). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

LoBianco, J. (1987) *National policy on languages*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Long, M.H. (1990) Maturational constraints on language development. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition* 12, 3, 251-285.

Long, M.H. (1993) Second language acquisition as a function of age: substantive findings and methodological issues. In K.Hyltenstam and A.Viberg (Eds.), *Progression and regression in language* (pp. 196-221). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Long, M.H. (1996) The role of the linguistic environment in second language acquisition. In W.C.Ritchie and T.K.Bhatia (Eds.), *Handbook of second language acquisition* (pp. 413-468). New York: Academic Press.

Luke, A., McHoul, A.W., and Mey, J.L. (1990) On the limits of language planning: Class, state and power. In R.Baldauf and A.Luke (Eds.), *Language planning and education* (pp. 25-44). Clevedon, Avon: Multilingual Matters.

Malcolm, I.G. (1994) Aboriginal English inside and outside the classroom. *Australian Review of Applied Linguistics* 17, 1, 147-180.

Marshall, P. (Ed.) (1986) *The anarchist writings of William Godwin*. London: Freedom Press.

McGroarty, M. (1991) English instruction for linguistic minority groups. Different structures, different styles. In M.Celce-Murcia (Ed.), *Teaching English as a second or foreign language*. Second edition (pp. 372-385). Cambridge, MA: Newbury House/Harper and Row.

Michaels, S. (1981) Sharing time: Childrens narrative style and differential access to literacy. *Language in Society* 10, 423-442.

Pennycook, A. (1995) English in the world/The world in English. In J.W.Tollefson (Ed.), *Power and inequality in language education* (pp. 34-58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Phillipson, R. (1992) *Linguistic imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ramirez, J.D. (1992) Executive summary [Special Issue.]. *Bilingual Research Journal* 16, (1-2).

Ramirez, J.D., Yuen, S.D., and Ramey, D.R. (1991) Executive summary final report: Longitudinal study of structured English immersion strategy, early-exit and late-exit transitional bilingual education programs for language-minority children. San Mateo, CA: Aguirre International.

Sato, C.J. (1985) Linguistic inequality in Hawaii: The post-creole dilemma. In N.Wolfson and J.Manes (Eds.), *Language of inequality* (pp. 255-272). Berlin: Mouton.

Sato, C.J. (1989) A non-standard approach to Standard English. *TESOL Quarterly* 23, 2, 259-282.

Sato, C.J. (1991) Language attitudes and sociolinguistic variation in Hawaii. In J.Cheshire (Ed.), *English around the world: Sociolinguistic perspectives* (pp. 647-663). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schinke-Llano, L. (1983) Foreigner talk in content classrooms. In H.W.Seliger and M.H.Long (Eds.), *Classroom-oriented research in second language acquisition* (pp. 146-164). Rowley, MA: Newbury House.

Shotton, J. (1993) *No master high or low. Libertarian education and schooling 1890–1990.* Bristol: Libertarian Education.

Skutnabb-Kangas, T., Phillipson, R., and Rannut, M. (Eds.)(1995) *Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination.* Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Smith, M.P. (1980) *The libertarians and education.* London: Methuen.

Spring, J. (1975) *A primer of libertarian education.* New York: Free Life Editions.

Strozer, J.R. (1994) *Language acquisition after puberty.* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Tollefson, J.W. (Ed.) (1995) *Power and inequality in language education.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ward, C. (1995) *Talking schools.* London: Freedom Press.

Wolfram, W. (1969) *A sociolinguistic description of Detroit Negro speech.* Arlington, VA: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Wright, N. (1989) *Assessing radical education. A critical review of the radical movement in English schooling, 1960-1980.* Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

THIS WAY TO
A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE

THE ANARCHIST AGENDA — A SYMPOSIUM

THERE IS A MYTHIC QUALITY TO ANARCHISM. Its pantheon of heroes is slight and not very inspirational. Predominantly dead, white, European men, they produced a relatively small literature--manifestly radical but lacking in a comprehensive theory of revolution. As in all mythology, there are some central stories but these are mainly stories of battles lost and of State repression.

Despite its past, incomplete theoretical base, there is a present consensus that anarchism as a philosophical guide requires that it be practiced. Theory informs practice, practice informs theory. Do you have a problem with that?

Well, what is it that anarchists practice? What do they do? What should they do? What follows are the answers of a handful of anarchist writers. Their agendas are fascinating and provocative. Some are angry, some almost depressive. Some are practical and clear, some symbolic and obscure. Some are clearly individualistic, most are social.

I called this symposium because I think that this is the conversation we need to be having now. I hope that it will become a serious discussion in your circle and that you will join the symposium which I will continue in the next issue.

Howard J. Ehrlich

Brian Martin

Ten Areas for Anarchist Initiatives

Anarchists have been prominent in developing critiques of the state, political parties and religion and in promoting self-management in areas such as education, industry, and environment. Yet anarchism potentially has a much wider range of application. Here's a list of some possibilities that have not been developed as much as they might be. Others will have their own lists. Two principles underlie these suggestions. First is opposition to systems of hierarchy, domination or exploitation and their replacement by egalitarian, self-managed social arrangements. Second is that the methods of anarchist practice should reflect the goals being sought: non-dominating methods should be used to promote a society without domination. For example, anarchists have rejected capturing state power as a means to a stateless society, and similarly should reject violence as a means to a nonviolent society.

1. Bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is a way of organizing work based on hierarchy and the division of labor. It is the dominant organizational form in the state, corporations, political parties, trade unions, etc. What are the best ways to transform bureaucracies from within and without and to create systems that are organized by those who work in and with them?

2. Communications. Mass media like television and big newspapers are inherently undemocratic, whereas network media like telephone and computer networks are more participatory. How can popular use of network media be strengthened and used to undermine the dominant role of mass media and their government and corporate partners.

3. Demarchy. Anarchists have criticized representative democracy, usually proposing federations of self-managing groups, and sometimes consensus. Another alternative is demarchy, which replaces state and bureaucracy by networks of functional groups (dealing with community "functions" such as industry, education and the arts) in each locality, the members of which are chosen randomly from volunteers. How can alternatives such as demarchy be tested and promoted?

4. Feminism. Anarchafeminism argues for gender equality via eliminating systems of hierarchy in society rather than promoting a few women withing these systems, which is the path of liberal feminism. Some strands of the feminist movement have incorporated anarchist sentiments, though seldom in explicit form. How can the anarchist movement confront male domination from within? How can anarchafeminist ideas be turned into practical action?

5. The market. The reality and ideology of the "free market" (that is, state-sponsored private exploitation) is overwhelming. Anarchists of collectivist persuasion (libertarian socialists) have long criticized the market and supported alternatives such as collectives and community provision. What grassroots initiatives will work to build such alternatives while undermining the state-market system?

6. Networking. "Networking" is a buzz word but nevertheless describes how people are building links with each other and counteracting the isolating and alienating effects of economic and political systems. Can networking be turned into a stronger method of social action?

7. Property. Ownership is the foundation of captitalism. States are creating new markets by making property out of what was previously unowned, such as genetic information. Anarchists have challenged property, for example through squatting. What campaigns can undermine the widespread belief in property as natural? What strategies are there to promote non-ownership and collective use of goods and ideas?

8. Social defense. Organized nonviolent action by communities is a possible alternative to military defense. It also empowers people to resist other forms of oppression and repression. Use of nonviolent action globally is more and more visible; many nonviolent activists have anarchist sympathies. How can the energies of nonviolent action be used to undermine diverse systems of hierarchy and exploitation, including the state, the military and capitalism?

9. Technology. Cities, factories and communication systems are technological constructions that often build in hierarchy. "Alternative technology" is often compatible with a more participatory and equal society. Many campaigns, such as against nuclear power and in favor of small-scale renewable energy systems, are compatible with anarchist goals and methods. What about campaigns around surveillance technologies, technologies of repression, cars, etc.?

10. Theory. Ideas are central to social struggles. Most of the intellectual work in government, corporations and universities is too technical or obscure to be of any value for popular use, or els, like advertising, it is manipulative. Are there ideas and methods of thinking that are specially suited for developing insights and strategies to challenge hierarchical systems? How can "theory," thinking systematically, become a popular pastime rather than an elite pursuit?

Neala Schleuning

What Is To Be Done?

The anarchist agenda must be built on the foundation of a critique of power that engenders collective empowerment and action. How are we to think about acting together? Anarchism's strong theoretical base already includes many fine analytical tools: Marxism(s), decentralization, direct action, deconstruction and the insights of the Situationalists, a critique of power, among others. What old perspectives still hold true; what new agendas must we take up? Here are a few suggestions for enriching future dialog.

1. Context, embeddedness, background, history are critical for survival. Central to the human enterprise is our survival as communities of people. We cannot do it alone. A people who pay no attention to history, to the context and consequences of their actions, to their alienation from others will not be able to fulfill themselves, nor change the world for all of us. A people who do not nurture context—whether it be a human context or an environmental/ecological context or the context of work or of social organization—these people will not survive. History is another kind of context. It is a setting, a backdrop, which allows for the long view, a means to place our current realities in perspective, to show us alternatives, to give us knowledge of prior hopes and persistence and endurance. We must ask ourselves each day, everywhere we go, how am I connected? What is my context? What is my history? How am I meshed with others—especially politically and economically?

The most important context for survival is, of course, the earth itself and the integrity of its diverse bioregions. We must find ways to make real our connections to the natural world. In part, this effort will require a change in orientation and learning to understand the intricacies of our cultural linkages to place. A return to decentralized, low (but efficient) technologies and need-based economic activities coupled with a commitment to solar energy will go a long way toward preserving the earth.

2. There is no self outside of community and connectedness. The great myth of the modern era is that there is a self that is independent, set free of all context, of all community. Individualist Anarchism (IA) is one face of modern individualism where the self is seen as the primary political actor. Usually, IA emphasizes criticism and individual rebellious acts. The self-as-rebel becomes an icon of alienation. In its active, creative mode, it is detournment and the struggle to break out of existing modes of thought, of image, of action. Posturing and posing, it seeks to attract attention, to parrot the world of the spectacle, to expose its emptiness and bankruptcy. It seeks to stand out, to be outrageous, to be special and unique, to distinguish itself from the deadening standardization of the techno-consumer world, showing us the thin veneers of our own superficial identities. On its dark side, it is isolated, separated. It can be self-serving, me, mine, selfish, indifferent. It can be destructive.

All Anarchists are rebellious, however. And IA is not really about politics, because politics is about creating community with others. Politics is partly about being "against," but it is more about figuring out how to be "with." Although it is a good critic, IA often does not see the weakness of its "otherness." Whether anarchist or not, the modern isolated self is not free; its experience is not freedom. It is beset on every side, enclosed by the narrow constraints of powerlessness and passivity and manipulated to the ends of consumer capitalism. There is no closure, no comfort in a self outside of community, there is only the imperative of the unfulfilled, the searching, the desire for "more." The modern individual cannot be active by itself; it is only a frozen moment, a representation of a self. Its role is passive. The star and the audience do not participate in one another. The true self is an active, empowered self; active with others and through others; active in the context of others; active within political community.

3. Diversity. Diversity is the primary axiom of all of nature, yet we seldom apply this concept to our own lives. All monocultures are destructive of life. Monocultures of corn kill the soil, attract and breed hostile predators, leave the whole species vulnerable to annihilation. Monocultures of animals destroy habitat, breed themselves out of existence. Monocultures of economic production create corporate monopoly and massive exploitation of limited resources. A healthy community is diversity; a diversity of life, of ideas, of economic and creative energies. Diversity maintains a vital balance, limits power over and revitalizes equitable political power relations between people. Individuality without balance and without diversity is a perilous, fragile existence, and cannot create stable communities. We must solve the social conundrum of intolerance and racism and the other ways in which we destroy instead of appreciate the other. True communities celebrate the odd, the unique, the unusual, the different, the strange, and understand that survival of one is survival of all.

4. Property, and its contemporary manifestation, consumerism. The idea of private property must be rejected. Property is not land or things; property is an attitude. Property is about enclosing, about fences, about keeping others away. It is about limiting opportunities instead of expanding them. It is about living a narrow, paranoid, furtive life, always pacing the borders of ownership, keeping the thieves and predators at bay, strengthening the fences and narrowing the gates. Property is contrary to community, because I must always look after mine, rather than ours.

Consumerism is beyond borders and fences. It is about the construction of a capitalist identity, an individual caught forever in the endless loop of consuming the unnecessary. It is not real identity, it is identity that must always change, always destabilize. Consumerism demands "more" all the time, it is not satisfied with needs but thrives on fantasies of wants and desires. To not own is to be free. To not own is to have a self-renewing, sustainable commons from which one can meet ones needs. To save the earth we must address the immorality of consumerism.

5. Economic democracy. Marx was right. Capitalism can never be democratic, and the wealth that it encloses must be redistributed. Political power and decision-making must also be decentralized, redistributed. We can alter the economic structure of our lives through collective action. We must become engaged in dialog with others, we must teach and learn. Our biggest "PR" challenge will be to expose the United States, and ourselves, as economic imperialists. We all participate in capitalism; we are not outside of it. We are all affected by this economic Chernobyl; the destructive practices of capitalism touch us all. We must go to the heart of the problem: overproduction and unequal distribution.

We must find new ways to challenge the emerging hegemony of the corporate state. Anarchism grounds its political analysis in a critique of the State, in part because the primary function of the State has always been to protect and conserve the enclosure of property and resources. Transnational corporations no longer need the nation state; they rule through control of the economy and the global media. Contemporary Anarchism must refine its critique of the State to ensure that a careful distinction is made between non-statist, but effectively coordinated, decentralized collective democratic action and the activities of imperialistic and internally repressive nation and corporate states. Anarchism must reclaim and rebuild the territories of civil and economic society by reclaiming the value of our work and our collective decision-making. Ⓐ

Joseph Heathcott

Gettin' real, gettin' busy:

anarchists in the here and now

One thing will save the anarchist movement from oblivion, and that is relevance. By relevance, I mean that anarchist approaches to solving problems should seem better than statist or capitalist approaches, as judged by a community of non-anarchists. Yet the current direction of the anarchist movement in North America bodes ill for any measure of relevance, given the many blocks to meaningful coalition-building that we impose on ourselves and our movement. In the past few years we have seen shifts toward a more open, positive, and broadly engaged anarchist movement, but these are timid and inconclusive steps. In order to expand our engagement with the world, and to begin to sound as though we have something to offer to our communities, we should consider the following:

1. Priorities for Organizing. Anarchists should organize, but not just as anarchists. Instead, we should engage our communities, our neighborhoods, and our workplaces as activists—activists who just happen to be anarchists as well. This may be a hard pill to swallow, and it does not mean that anarchists should *never* organize into exclusively anarchist groups. Rather, I want to suggest that we should re-think our proclivity toward enclavism—that is, dropping into all-anarchist groups *by default*. The world is vast and complicated, and we often create very simplistic and insular experiences for ourselves which, while perhaps comfortable, do little to connect us in meaningful ways with the people who live on our very street or work beside us in our jobs. While I admire the hard and dedicated work of anarchists to create alternative spaces such as infoshops and collectives, this should not be the end of organization.

2. Tools for Organizing. We should regard anarchism not as a fixed or ideal condition to achieve, but rather as a set of tools and ideas with which to interpret the world and to solve problems—whether those problems are mundane or extraordinary. We should be flexible, and see our anarchist contributions to non-anarchist groups as one approach among many. We must never arrogate to ourselves that self-righteous, all-knowing attitude for which we deride the left and the right alike. We have to become comfortable with the notion that in many situations and circumstances, non-anarchist solutions might actually work better than anarchist solutions. Or perhaps at least we should recognize the value of a range of possibilities, and do what we can to provide an anarchist bent on a given strategy or development within democratic deliberation. Our tools and tactics ought to contribute to a larger variety of tools and tactics, a wider pool from which grass roots groups can draw.

3. Inspirations for Organizing. Anarchists should be heterodox in our borrowings, ideas, approaches, and strategies. Historically, anarchism has been strong on critique but weak on solutions. We should mine other political traditions with abandon, from populism, progressivism, and neighborhood organizing, to feminism, social ecology, and labor activism. We need to seek out useful strategies from a wide range of eras and places, and adopt approaches that work in a given context—not impose pre-selected solutions onto situations. (Pre-selected solutions, rigid and devoid of flexibility, have a habit of failing). Anarchists have much to learn, not only from other political groups and traditions, but from traditions and practices that are not exclusively political but which speak to a given problem. Thus, for example, we might learn low-capital production methods from informal sector tradespeople in India, or collective social-financial arrangements from women's groups in Kenya and Puerto Rico and the Sudan. We might seek inspiration for large-scale institution building from the Mondragon cooperatives of Spain, or fuel-efficient cooking techniques from Chinese farmers. None of these groups would be described as "anarchist," but so what? We can take what is good from political traditions or social practices, abandon or militate against those aspects which contradict our principles, and thereby fashion new possibilities.

4. Jettison Dogma. If we can develop an appreciation for heterodox strategies and context-sensitive approaches to solving problems, we can train ourselves to think clearly and reasonably, and to avoid dogma. Anarchists often deride the Leninist/Trotskyist left for its pre-digested pabulum of answers, and for an arrogance that stems from unwavering commitments to particular orthodoxies. Yet while anarchists by no means wrap themselves around one creed, the movement in general is plagued by innumerable splinter dogmas. These dogmas become litmus tests for each group to determine who is and is not an anarchist, a futile and counter-productive pursuit. Instead, anarchists must learn not to reject concepts or practices out of hand—such as technology or authority or work—without a more measured consideration of how and when they might be useful. Our tendency to develop ludicrous criteria for a good community (one that is anti-work, free of technology, or totally communitarian, for example) isolates us from our fellow humans everywhere—from East Africa to the South Pacific to Central America and Europe, not to mention in our own neighborhoods. This makes our contributions less relevant, because we advance from dogma, rather than from where people are at in their daily lives, in their thinking and in their needs. Most people in any society tend to think more complexly than dogmatists—anarchists included. We desperately need to broaden the anarchist horizon. Instead of saying "technology is always bad," "institutions are inherently hierarchical," or "authority is always evil," we might do well to ask "when is technology appropriate, and when is it destructive? When might institutions promote the health of a movement? Are there some instances of authority that are justified in certain situations?" We need to begin to listen to the world at least half as much as we preach to ourselves.

Many of the ideas expressed above developed over the course of the early 1990s as a particular variety of practice within the anarchist movement among a loose network of activists centered around Bloomington, Indiana. These include, besides the author, Sarah B, Crafty, MLane, Sid, Mike H, B Moody, Kate Kaos, Reciprocity Rik, Tim S, Rael, M@ce, Jeff Subhumyn, Heather "Flygirl" E, Citizen Tom, and others who shall remain nameless. The author is indebted to all of them.

Michael Bacon

The theme to these thoughts is to focus and mobilize our (meager) resources and move.

1. Commit to succeed. From gum on the sidewalk to genocide, the opportunities for political work are too many. Attending weekly meetings, one witnesses a process equivalent to people pulling out their hair over what to do, or, worse, jumping on the "cause of the week," saying, "I'll do this", and after leaving the room, forgetting. Anarchists only rarely focus on do-able projects and follow through. We are too easily distracted. As a result our effectiveness is limited to criticisms of society and, especially, other political movements. We are not effective as innovators of new forms of social organization. Or, maybe being overwhelmed assures we don't have to succeed. Thinking, theory, and action are necessary things and are not separable. To argue over that point is one of the distractions. However, it is time for anarchists to begin to move that which is represented into that which is lived.

2. Alternatives to capitalist economics 1. For our own satisfaction and confidence, as well as for the public's elucidation, anarchists must develop economic theories and models which offer genuine alternatives and challenges, to the society as organized by capital. If we could create one effective and durable "think tank," it should be in economics. Anarchism possesses many models in history and in theory. These, however, must be brought up to date, resolving real issues of the current time, and in understandable language. Then we, too, could compete globally.

3. Alternatives to capitalist economics 2. Concrete action is more difficult than theory and planning. Still, even with our current resources, we can make steps towards creating a system which will parallel that of capital. For example, anarchists:

a. join and support existing organizations (food co-ops, day care, block associations, etc.) to actually help them, and to, without guilt, further politicize them;
b. can secure or obtain property and land, to live in, to grow things to eat, places to learn and play, vouchsafe the last bits of nature, safety zones within the empire;
c. move to Philadelphia. Folks there see the importance of the getting of property for they are doing it. If there was a place to move to, to help create a living community, it is Philadelphia.

To an extent these projects are underway, anarchists need to promote and publicize them to the wider public.

4. Claim psycho-geography everywhere. Publishing, discussion groups, forums, media, street and real theater, cabaret, and the starting of schools for KIDS. Remember, Stelton began as a Sunday school.

5. Social defense. Be ready for reaction. Especially avoid police, we don't want our progressive work mediated for the public by police while we are yet small and vulnerable.

Richard Kostelanetz

In college nearly 4 decades ago, I became an anarchist, initially through reading Paul Goodman and Norman O. Brown. I did a B.A. honors thesis on Henry Miller that was a political interpretation of his books as being primarily not about erotic experience but self-liberation. I later did several books about John Cage, an anarchist artist if there ever was one, and inadvertently discovered that I was born the exact day Emma Goldman died (14 May 1940), which, given my politics, may or may not be important. In the late 1960s, I edited a series of future-centered social-thought anthologies beginning with *Beyond Left & Right* (1968) and have ever since used both those epithets (right and left) to characterize retrograde thinking, albeit of different kinds. In the early 1970s, I voted Libertarian in New York City, initially because the mayoral candidate said the only serious cure for urban crimes was the decriminalization of drug use/possession/sales, and have readily voted Libertarian ever since. In the late 1980s, I became a contributing editor of the bimonthly *Liberty*. To Robert Black's crack that a libertarian is a Republican who has done drugs, I've added a category of an anarchist who has learned something about economics, which is clearly me (who voted Republican only once, for a neighborhood used-book seller).

Now to deal directly with Martin's proposals. To most of them I find myself responding less positively than negatively. What's generally missing from his or any other list of initiatives is appreciations of social chaos and accompanying surprise. For instance, whatever is happening now on the Internet could not have been initiated; it couldn't have ever been predicted, not even a decade ago, when modems were first mass-merchandized. Politically, the most interesting thing about the community in which I live, SoHo, a manufacturing district in lower Manhattan, is that no city official ruled that artists and art galleries should inhabit the abandoned lofts, beginning in the early 1960s. It happened, in part because the decline of light manufacturing in the 1960s left lofts empty, but also because artists were willing to rent and even purchase industrial spaces that were officially "illegal for living."

More specifically contra-Martin, I regard bureaucracies as necessary to accomplish certain kinds of work. They tend to burgeon internally until they become self-defeating, at which time the company either cuts back on excessive middlemen or petitions the state for compensatory support (usually on the grounds of "saving jobs"). Needless to say, the latter efforts should be denied, probably in all cases. The problem with growing governmental bureaucracies is the absence of any stockholder corrective.

The increasing use of "participatory" "telephone and computer networks" is already undermining the mass media. Watch out for attempts of those predisposed to social control and/or mass merchandizing to restrict, usually with laws couched in the rhetoric of social benefits, this cultural chaos.

Beware of criticisms of "representative democracy," because they usually accompany proposals for social overlording. The public may be "wrong," but at least democratic procedures function as a chaos that is permanently open-ended.

The problem with modern capitalism is not open markets but the attempts for corporations and social groups to undermine them by requesting political favor, initially in the form of protection from free competition. A familiar example is academic tenure, which is no different from any employment licensing. What made the Clinton effort at health-care reform dubious to me was the failure to even consider undermining the economic base of medical extortion by eliminating the requirement of licensing. If an experienced nurse could open next door a medical office charging half price for a basic visit, medical pricing could be seriously threatened. What keeps health-care prices so high is not any "free market" but the willingness of the state and insurance companies to support whatever prices are demanded.

One libertarian truth is that private property is a principal defense against incursions of the state. Some historic anarchists were simply wrong about this one.

One enemy is illegitimate authority, whether in restricting expression or extorting money or forbidding access to something many people desperately desire (e.g., alcohol, sex, pornography, tobacco, abortion, drugs). Another enemy is monopoly, sometimes authorized by the state, other times through ancillary development. In *The End of Intelligent Writing* (1974), which TransAction Books will reprint next year under its subtitle of *Literary Politics in America*, I showed how certain book publishers have dominated the dissemination of radical criticism in America less through the quality of what they publish than through the collaboration of certain prominent book-reviewing media and other publicity machinery, along with the concomitant reluctance of other publishers of radical criticism to challenge this dominance. What was true twenty-five years ago is still true now.

What I did as an anarchist in this decades-old book is what I (and we) can best do now—articulate our radical ideas in our daily lives. Just last week I was summoned to jury duty. One case involved a fireman who, having been injured several years ago, was now suing New York City for disability, even thought he had gone back to work. Knowing little more than this outline, I spoke against the current fashion to ask the state to pay for things, beginning with the construction of new sports arenas, that should be privately funded. Negligent lawyers feast on the state for the same reason that sports moguls do—because it has a "deep pocket." The second case involved a young black man purportedly possessing an unlicensed gun at the public concert on 125th St. and Seventh Avenue. The prosecutor also claimed that shots from this gun were fired in the air; but since the bullets could not be found (and, incidentally, no one was hurt), that could not be part of the charge. To a judge who seemed predisposed to tight gun control, I explained that the social group most seriously disadvantaged by gun-control laws are the law-abiding poor in areas where the police have given up, such as side-street Harlem, where this young man probably lived, and that the abundance of guns in America is one reason why there has never been a military takeover in this country. While shooting bullets into the air might be stupid and dangerous, it was no less loathsome than running a red light. People convicted of doing either should be reprimanded and even fined, but not incarcerated.

I was relieved to find that Brian Martin didn't mention the fashionable epithet Ecology, because whenever I hear that word I know from experience that soon afterwards will come the word Planning. And whenever I hear that second word, I as an anarchist instinctively head for the nearest exit.

The most disillusioning political experience I had recently as an anarchist came at the recent meeting of the New York Libertarian Forum. It was devoted to the 70th anniversary of the execution of Sacco & Vanzetti. From the audience I spoke of Sacco &Vanzetti as a prime example of the American tradition of political show trials that were designed to intimidate, with the enthusiastic help of the mainstream press, a radical element of the population, in that case Italian anarchists. In that respect, it resembled the Rosenberg Case, which scared Jewish Communists, by executing two dummies who wanted to be spies, but had no real secrets; and the recent Timothy McVeigh conviction, which intimidates so-called militias. Looking around me, I asked how many in the audience though McVeigh might not be guilty of having anything more than objectionable political opinions. The only hand to go up was mine! These weren't anarchists, I thought, but freaking liberals.

Howard Ehrlich, in asking for this essay, said "I do not want a reply or critique of Brian's small essay." I hope that he, as a fellow anarchist, doesn't mind my partial inability to follow his rules.

Peter McGregor

From free speech to freedom — where the journey is as important as, & integral with, the destination.

FREE SPEECH

1. The refusal of the ownership of ideas (eg. copyright, patents, even authorship?) Ideas, society — let alone history — individuality, etc., all presuppose our existence as inherently SOCIAL beings. It's important to acknowledge one's influences — both as thanks/appreciation, but also to reveal the specifics of our interconnectedness. The ownership of ideas is a means of both (a) controlling ideas, & (b) controlling people/society.

2. Detournement. Hence, we should — rather, we DO, all the time, at least implicitly (covertly ?) — borrow & learn from each other … all the better to understand & make our own lives. Namely, the learning/borrowing is a proactive process whereby we interpret & transform what we've learnt for our own interests/directions.

FREEDOM

3. Life as the expression of desire "We must have appetite, taste is the approach of death, the evasive value of those who are losing their appetite…" (Harry Hooton)

4. Developing ourselves by expressing ourselves Expression of appetite encourages (a) individual differences, & (b) the questioning of authority. Yet our irrepressibly social nature bursts forth in the multiplication of pleasures that arises when the indulgence of appetitie involves a shared game. Furthermore, the shared game reveals the potential inherent in our interactions… of communication as love.

5. Creating situations "If you dream alone, it's just a dream; if you dream together it's reality…" (Brasilian folksong)

The situationists' (& others' (see 1. above !)) project of jointly creating our lives & relationships — using whatever resources are available. For example, the reversal of oppressive social roles &/or expectations.

6. "The means are the ends in the making" (Gandhi)... the appropriation of 'whatever-resources-are-available', but not 'by-any-means-necessary'. Verily the journey is the destination in the making. An explicitly anarchist example of this pearl of social theory (wisdom), is the empowerment that flows in the shift from even-the-most-benevolent representative decision-making (let alone dictatorial or arbitrary rule !), to direct democracy.

7. A key measure of one's practice of anarchist theory is one's repudiation of domination in any spheres of society where one has individual or group privilege.

8. The spectacle & transparency. The separation between the directly lived & its representation is one of the most subversive forces in social life. While, on the one hand, that gap can be fruitfully detourned by acknowledging its existence, on the other hand, the preferable strategy may be to transcend the separation by establishing an identity/authenticity of transparency between the directly lived & the represented. Ⓐ

Ronald Creagh

My anarchist agenda

Many issues seem essential to me and yet are hardly covered. I will name a few, without any order of priority, although some are more urgent than others.

1. Visibility and perception of anarchism.

It is customary to blame the media for ignoring and distorting anarchism and anarchist ideas. Although this may be true, there are other aspects we should examine:

How is learning generated within anarchist circles? Are we always starting everything over again, trying to define the ABC of anarchism, or is there any development in our collective knowledge ? What are the prerequisites for such a growth?

Anarchist rhetoric: A few studies tend to demonstrate t hat anarchist rhetoric is self-defeating. Even if such is not the case, more consideration of this issue is required. How does anarchist rhetoric take into account the ambiguities and dilemmas of a particular historical situation? How can it promote a public sphere that enables collective decision making processes in periods of intensive social movements which require creative challenges, rather than simple denunciation and critique?

Self-censorship: why do people censure their anarchistic leanings and views?

Group organization: in the times of Emma Goldman and Gallieni, speaking tours were an essential step in the creation or development of groups. This practice seems to have been abandoned since the 1920s.

2. Changing our world views.

A. We are no single-minded preachers : our discourse must be broader. As a philosophy, we have to find out how anarchism can impregnate our various disciplines : science, technology, literature, art, etc. For instance, we cannot use rational argumentation as a power tool, we cannot accept scientific consensus as a criteria of the validity of a theory without taking into account the historical context. We need build an anarchist epistemology in all areas of thought, hoping that it may infuse the various collective views of the world.

This is particularly true in the field of economy, in which there is hardly any anarchist theory that may compare with the sophistication of Marxist analysis.

B. Our historical vision ought take into account the concrete collective agents of social change. For instance, in the Sacco-Vanzetti trial, the issue might have been different if anarchists had focused on the Bureau of Investigation and the Department of justice rather than on a global denunciation of capitalism and a proclamation of class conflict (even though that was also true).

The traditional anarchist critique of bureaucracy has hardly been developed and relies more on sarcastic generalities than on an analysis of self organizing *systems*.

C. There is a strong discrepancy between our ideals and the contemporary world. In order to be understood by others, we are constrained to compromise: we want a right to abortion, yet we reject the existing judicial system; we fight to obtain visas for illicit immigrants, although we believe in a world in which no one would need a travel permit; we strike for better wages while knowing that this is inadequate. In short, can we accept such contradictions as the better way to further our ideal society? Or should we consider ourselves as dissenters, eventually fight to be recognized as such, and look for alternative ways that rule out any conflict with the powers that be on their own grounds ?

This may also require that we present the world with positive messages and celebrations that suggest creative perspectives.

3. Large scale anarchism

A. There are times when cooperation with other movements is imperative, for instance to circumvent fascist propaganda. As a minority, on what grounds can we unite with those associations that possess the power to reap all the benefit of that partnership and achieve purposes which are totally alien to anarchist goals?

More generally, there are many people who are anarchists that are activists in other movements. How can we benefit from their experience and assist them in avoiding being coopted?

B. Even if we believe that small is beautiful, we cannot escape large scale decision making, for instance in foreign policy or actions that are needed on widely populated areas. What alternatives do we propose for large scale decision making? If we substitute an economy of desire to an economy based on needs, should we regulate those fluxes of desire?

4. Internationalism

A. Most contemporary anarchist writings have hardly been translated into English, the channel of international relations, and there still are many linguistic barriers, for instance between German and Italian. It is significant that some anthologies of contemporary anarchist thought hardly solicit the contribution of people writing in other languages.

B. There is a crucial need for an international anarchist cooperation in the struggle against the "new world order" of the multinational enterprises. Furthermore, only an international movement can now stem the development of fascism in a growing number of Western States.

C. Last but not least, we need to look at other cultures: Arab, Indian, Chinese, etc. to find out how anarchism can take root in those different settings.

Howard J. Ehrlich

If we continue on this path, we shall get where we are going.
(American Indian aphorism)

1. First things first. Our primary task at this time is to create anarchists. We are building towards an anarchist movement. There are too few anarchists today to do the work that needs to be done.

2. Obstacles to organizing. We need to acknowledge the levels of ***a***lienation, ***i***gnorance, ***d***enial, and **s**elf-rejection which characterizes a truly substantial part of the people in the western industrialized democracies. We are faced with a pandemic of this sociological "AIDS," and most of those infected are not going to become part of a revolutionary movement.

A second obstacle resides in the reverse celebrity process so common among many activists. We need to stop glamorizing the victims of capitalism and religion. Feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, giving comfort and hope to those imprisoned, teaching the illiterate, are decent things to do. However, in the absence of an anarchist agenda these acts of charity may do little more than maintain the safety valves of society. We need to comprehend our own motives as well as the motives of others: Are we assuaging our own guilt? Are we speaking to power?

3. Mapping our path. We need to acknowledge that while there is no one way to engage in this revolutionary project, that our mobilization has to grounded in a vision of a good society. Our actions have to evaluated by considering whether they are leading us in the direction we want to go or, at least, serve to confirm or disconfirm whether we have been walking on the right path.

4. Developing theory. We need an anarchist sociology and economics — and an anarchist perspective that is recognized in the academy. We need a critique of power and domination that offers people an explanation of their daily encounters. Our theory needs to identify the strategic sites for anarchist research and action. At a time in history when the State is being challenged seriously by nationalistic, ethnic-based movements, anarchist analyses should be in the forefront.

5. Building community. Recruitment is hard work. In established communities, it is usually not as valued as what as perceived as the substantive mission of the community. For anarchists, today especially, this *is* our substantive mission.

Communes and collective households and their supporting institutions are vital elements. We need to build alternative institutions that meet our collective needs, recognizing the age and life cycle differences among anarchists.

6. Alternative institutions. An alternative institution is a counter-institution organized along anarchist principles. If we cannot build our own institutions, institutions which meet our needs—economic, political, cultural, and social, then we are relegated to old left forms of opposition and resistance.

7. Educating ourselves. Recruitment, building alternative institutions and anarchist community does not come in an easy or natural manner. Most people have had little or no experience working collectively, have little knowledge of non-violent conflict resolution at a personal level, and often communicate in an aggressive or inegalitarian manner. Our collective inability to work in groups, to understand group dynamics, and to incorporate egalitarian and solidarity building techniques in our daily lives has had serious consequences for movement building.

Education in the affairs of the day and on the sociology of social pathologies must be an ongoing collective process. Only by grounding our knowledge in conversation with our peers can we more fully escape the relentless assault of the dominant media of education and mass communication.

8. Survival skills. For most anarchists, survival entails many questions. These are on my agenda. How much effort needs to be expended earning an income for self-support and for the support of the community? What can you do within the constraints of a capitalist labor market that isn't contradictory of anarchist ideals? Are there times when straight jobs can be educational or socially worthwhile? Can we develop an alternative money/trading system? Have we fully recognized the generational differences in accepting the different needs of people?

Finally, not only must we place mutual aid on our agenda, we need to develop organizational forms for its provision. This should include our needs for non-violent defense and support against State repression.

9. Diversity. Much effort is needed to maintain community and some people will prefer to stay within an anarchist enclave. Whatever we choose, I believe that if we work on the tasks above, we will build a community which is diverse with regard to gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity and skin color, education and social class. There is a necessity in diversity.

A serious commitment to "diversity" must include an active opposition to the white supremacist, theocratic, and fascist groups which are everywhere.

10. Anarchist media. The anarchist communications media are terribly underdeveloped. You can travel through most cities and see or hear no signs of an anarchist movement. Groups in every city should have a website. There should be an anarchist center presenting cultural and educational productions. Where is the anarchist TV program on public access TV? Where are the radio programs? Finally, where is the weekly anarchist newspaper that reports seriously on national and international events?

The cultural and news media are pivotal in building an anarchist community and strengthening a revolutionary culture.

READING POLITICAL JUSTICE:
A NEW, EXPERIENTIAL ANARCHIST APPROACH

Arthur Efron

A year ago, while reading *Political Justice*, I happened to see a bumper sticker a 4-wheel drive pick-up truck, of the type now so popular in the U.S.A. The sticker read: "We Live, Eat, Sleep, and Love on Our Cycles." I also glimpsed two motorycles loaded on that truck. In that bumper sticker, I recognized the typically American assertion of freedom: the truck's owners were saying "This is the way we choose to spend our lives, and that choice may not be criticized by others, no matter what anyone else thinks of it." I was about to shrug this off as harmless when I involuntarily thought of something I had been reading in *Political Justice*. Some of Godwin's arguments about that which he terms "duty" came to mind. Godwin is a moralist, but he is not being simply moralistic in stating that duty is necessarily central to our lives. He is not claiming that we all have duties to parents, spouses, or children, simply because those are our relatives. It is Godwin who claimed that in some circumstances, it would be necessary to rescue a non-kinsman philosopher from a fire rather than our own brother or even mother. For Godwin, duty is more like a contextual principle of our effects on other people: it tells us, for example, that when we know people we encounter are destitute, then we must expend some of our energies in helping them—and that we have to give them that help *instead of* selfishly riding our bikes night and day.

Although I hope I have a grasp of what Godwin might have in mind by the term "duty," I still have my suspicions about the notion. I am not entirely sure that if we were all to help others in need, rather than engaging in the many activities we have an interest in doing, the world necessarily would become a better place. I don't know that much; Godwin thought he did know that much, and that is one of the problems of reading *Political Justice* today. Still, when I look inside my own mind and feelings, when I more deeply consider what it is I value and what I distrust, then these doubts about Godwin, while retaining their validity, become far less important. I find I am actually more sympathetic to what Godwin has to say about duty than I am to the kind of sentiment of freedom I see emblazoned upon that bumper. In fact, if I think about it, I realize that Godwin's principle of duty is too vital to be denied. Lacking his assurance, as I lack his certainty throughout *Political Justice*, I find myself nonetheless in the position of affirming his principle. I would call duty, in his sense, as I would call several other of his principles,

"back to the wall" societal propositions. They are principles which, if denied, would leave us with a world of authoritarian order and its inevitable chaos. If everyone in the world were content with the free disposal of their energy in the manner of the cycle riders, I do know that the world would be even worse than it is now. It is not a matter, as Max Stirner was to argue, of each of us having an ego that we must not and in fact cannot give over to the collective social self (which term is a mere illusion for Godwin as well as for Stirner). But a world of selfish egos would be an extremely bad world. I know that because I have seen plenty of that kind of world, and have been part of it. For me as a reader in the 1990s, Godwin's principle of duty, like most of the principles he announces in *Political Justice*, must be questioned and restated so that it would lose its ring of certainty. But could I really reject it? When I reached the roots of the matter, I realized that my back was to the wall, and I could retreat no further: I could throw out duty, in his sense of the word, only if I were willing to accept a perfectly loathsome world.

Let us hear this in some of Godwin's own words. We will quote him from a later passage on "virtue," where duty[1] has now become implicit.

> If self-love be the only principle of action, there can be no such thing as virtue. Benevolent intention is essential to virtue. Virtue, where it exists in any eminence, is a species of conduct modelled upon a true estimate of the different reasons inviting us to a preference. He that makes a false estimate and prefers a trivial and partial good to an important and comprehensive one, is vicious. (Godwin, 1985; p.385)

These few sentences bring out major aspects of Godwin's thought. 1) There is qualification as well as firmness: virtue has to reach some eminence or degree, or as we might say, it has to reach a level of critical mass, in order to be worth talking about in this context. It is not virtue in the abstract. Godwin takes pains to support his positions, not only by piling up reasons and assertions in their favor, but also by carefully attending to the scope and precise meanings of his terms. This quality can easily be missed if one notices only those statements which appear to be given as absolutes. 2) Second, virtue even in its "eminence" is contextual, that is, it is based on a true estimate of the different reasons inviting us to develop a preference. 3) That we can and do make such estimates is a function of our capacity for reason, but, 4) furthermore, human reason is integrally related to "benevolent intention." As Chris Jones has shown, this is part of a common argument for universal benevolence in late 18th century; it is one that Godwin states coherently. Here we are far away from Freud's understanding that the intellect is grounded in sadism, or, for that matter, from Jacques Lacan's noton of the ego as basically paranoic. 5) Finally, we have to absorb the force of Godwin's concluding word in the brief passage I have quoted: those who settle for "a trivial and partial good" when they know that there are important and comprehensive goods to be had instead, are not merely mistaken: they are "vicious." What could that mean?

Let me tackle that question by pointing out two basic approiaches we might take. One of these is simply to chalk up the word "vicious" to Godwin's moralist bias, in which he had been well schooled. Motorcycle riders, after all, are not usually "vicious," and it is hardly desirable that we be led into thinking of them as such. On the other hand, if we search for Godwin's meaning in more empathic ways, we can see that the huge aggregate of human devotion to trivial pursuits is indeed what vitiates social improvement. The reason is that we thoughtlessly channel so much of our constructive energies into activities that make no contribution to lifting any of humankind's burdens, such as the continual resurgence of famine, the prevelance of displaced people, or the use of torture by governments. Such displacement can well be called "vicious."

This approach to Godwin is experiential in John Dewey's sense of the term. I seek to validate Godwin's principles by appealing to all that I know, and by trying to understand his own experience in so far as it bears on his argument. In the mass of argumentation that makes up his 750-page text, I propose that we each start again, and that we ask what is valid now? But we must ask this about basic principles that matter to us, rather than give this text primarily an historical reading. This is the opposite of the validation performed recently by George Crowder, in his book *Classical Anarchism*. Crowder assures us that Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin all make very good sense, and that they basically agree with one another. But, we can say this only if we notice the underlying premise of their thinking, which was in each case a form of scientism, or the faith that scientific progress would sooner or later bring us into an enormously improved, virtually utopian world. But while the great classical anarchists may have thought that, that cannot be what makes them important for us now. Scientism is a rightly discredited faith.

Fortunately, even if *Political Justice* is indebted to scientism, the book is not all of a piece. Even the assurance of the triumph of reason is sometimes tempered with realization that it may never happen: "It may be to a certain degree doubtful," writes Godwin in a chapter on obedience, "whether the human species will ever be emancipated from their present subjection and pupillage, but let it not be forgotten that this is their condition" (p.248). We are not obliged to accept or reject the book's arguments as a whole, and we have good indications within it that we need not do so. What *Political Justice* is, is a mass of arguments as well as one overall massive argument. Godwin may have believed that he had systematically laid out his case, but despite the form of the book, with its carefully counterpoised arguments and their opposing viewpoints, and despite its systematic division into 8 sequential "books," *Political Justice* has an undeniable experimental quality. As Godwin recalls in the preface to the first edition, the book was not fully planned out. He only came to see what he was saying while writing it. The major revisions for the second edition of 1796, he admits, are not completely satisfactory, and in the third edition of 1798, he made further minor and major changes and deletions. All of this is well-discussed by Peter H. Marshall, in his biography of Godwin. Marshall also shows us a Notebook entry where Godwin planned still further important changes which he did not have opportunity to write (Marshall, 1984; p.199), and other modifications were incuded in a book of essays Godwin published in 1797 but did not incorporate into his text (Marshall, pp.163-68). Rather than apologizing for the book's rough edges, Godwin says that he did not think it wise to "suppress any opinion because it was inconsistent with the prejudice or persuasion of others" (p.72). Marshall also states, correctly, that the summary Godwin added in the 3rd edition is inconsistent with the text, and that he realized this. The book was intended to exhibit "perfect explicitness and unreserve," and if this purpose turned out to be "an improper one," no reversal was possible. For one thing, any impulse to reverse that experimental quality came too late into the writing process, and for another, the work would lose all integrity if the author "rescinded sentiments originally advanced as true," as long as those statements could still be presented with their "original evidence" (p.72).

A major dissonance that Godwin allows to remain in the book is its absolute faith in the certainty of truth alongside a recogniton that human situations are immensely varied. Godwin greatly honors the "immutable" quality of truth (p.117, etc.) and at the same time makes the strikingly modern statement that "Everything in man may be said to be in a state of flux; he is a Proteus whom we know not how to detain." (p.186). These claims may not be in formal contradiction, but they point to different intellectual worlds: the first toward the Age of Reason, and the second to an acceptance of change so inclusive that it must deny anything immutable, including truth. It is as if Godwin is saying that Reason, the greatest of human powers, and our only way of determining truth, is itself unchanging and not in flux; yet everything human is in flux. A number of students with whom I have read *Political Justice* are troubled by this disjunction.

But this is where I am going to draw a line of resistance to our modern preoccupations. It would be too easy to `"deconstruct" *Political Justice*, showing that its arguments are undercut by its own admissions. That would be sterile; and instead of accepting the book's experimental quality and responding to it accordingly, we would only be reading it from a safe observational station. That the book undercuts its own propositions is a conclusion we would be foredoomed to reach anyway, given the assumptions of deconstruction. What would be valuable to do, however, is something quite different: to *reconstruct* (the term is John Dewey's) this book's central anarchist arguments by clearing our own pathways within it, and linking them, selectively, to the trails of reasoning that Godwin has provided. Based on my own 35-years of reading in this work, I am willing to predict that if we adopt such a procedure, we will find that lines of Godwin's arguments will first seem to collapse—and then will be reconstructed.

The only major aspects of his thought that I think must be unequivocally rejected, insofar as these are critical for anarchist thought, are the two obvious ones which have been pointed out many times by Godwin scholars: one, that he falls into authoritarianism in his uncritical confidence that the opinion of one's peers will form a non-coercive kind of pressure to control our tendencies toward antisocial behavior; and two, that we need not undertake any action "in concert," that is, in cooperative consultation with other people. I have found that these strands in his argument tend to be written in a manner that betrays their unsoundness. The arguments for the fine effects of social pressure exerted by one's fellows tend to be given in flat, confident declarations, lacking the usual density of consideration that Godwin gives to other topics.

As for his suspicions about more than two people managing to work together in a rational manner, his assertions tend to slip by without being properly argued. At one point Godwin asks, theoretically, why "men in a collective capacity" cannot be just as fully entrusted to follow the discipline of reason as men in their individual existences (p.692), but this uncharacteristic admission is quickly passed over. Then later, Godwin seems to be anxious and impatient about the whole topic of cooperative reasoned action, and reaches for the easy answer that this may not even be necessary: "We ought to be able to do without one another" (p.761). In the context of the many vigorously considered problems in the book, this vacuous "ought" is a low point, Godwin's equivalent of mumbling under his breath.

Locating these major weak points is not difficult; what is interesting about them is their conjunction with weak writing, as if Godwin himself could not identify adequately with what he was trying to say. The real problem for readers sympathetic to anarchism, is how best to deal with the many strong points of the argument, points which often need to be restated, qualified, reconstructed and—if there is to be any anarchist future—defended.

I propose that a creative method for accomplishing such a reading is to do what I was beginning to do in my example of the motorcycle riders: consider the various propositions put forth and ask, by bringing to bear our own fullest experience and knowledge, if we dare to reject what Godwin is saying. I have found that very often, I could not reject: my back was put to the wall, and I had to take my stand with Godwin.

Here then are a few such examples, which I focus upon for their value in thinking in anarchist ways about the future of social relations.

Veracity: "That the Motives to Deceive Can But Rarely Occur"

Here we are dealing with Godwin's apparent naivete. In a comment on Part IV of *Gulliver's Travels* Godwin is more than eager to take the satiric text at face value, while regretting that "its mere playfulness of form" prevented it from instructing mankind effectively (p.552). From the example of Swift's Houyhnhnms, Godwin draws support for his belief that after government is abolished, it will become feasible to persuade people, solely by means of "reasonableness," to cooperate for their common benefit (pp.552-53). No coercion will be necessary; truth will triumph—although not immediately. It is much easier to assume such a thing if you believe, as Godwin apparently did, that "the obvious use of the faculty of speech is to inform, and not to mislead" (Godwin, p. 217), and that deception seldom would be attempted if people were to recognize what they owe to one another. Of course he knows that in political matters, deception is rampant and inevitable, but this does not prevent him from claiming that we know human beings enough to be sure that "the motives to deceive can but rarely occur, while the motives to veracity will govern the stream of human actions" (p.217).

That is a wonderful wish, but can it be any more than that? In reading *Political Justice*, we will encounter such claims for the invincibility of truth. It is virtually mandatory to doubt them, but it is also necessary to not surrender the values which they hold. The undefended generalization that speech exists to inform rather than mislead must rouse our doubts, but when the process of doubt has run its course, will we actually reject the principle? In Godwin's favor, we can try to support it genetically. Lying, widespread as it is in society, is not something people do at birth. The infant prior to language knows nothing of such use (or of irony, wit, or double meanings) and in the early stages of language acquisition, I venture to say that lying plays no part. Lying is learned behavior, and authoritarian society encourages such behavior by pressuring people to pretend that they are in compliance with society's mores and its political presumptions. Godwin knows all about such things. I suppose that we will be unable to assert, with Swift's noble horses, that it is unimaginable why anyone would "say the thing which is not," but the high position of veracity in human motivation might be supportable after all. If not, maybe we should forget about social anarchism, which depends on being able to trust people to communicate honestly.

The Emulation of Excellence

The term "equity" for Godwin counters the apparent exception to the "moral equality of mankind." For while we all "partake of a common nature," the great benefactors of mankind appear to be so exceptional that their equality with the rest of us is not apparent. But this is only an appearance, because we all have some "equity," meaning some human share, in their accomplishments. We identify with the great liberating minds not because we feel we are their equals, but because as reasoning human beings, we share something with them. The important claim for an anarchist future is that equity "is calculated to infuse into every bosom an emulation of excellence" (pp.183-84). As readers coming to this book 200 years after its publication, we can easily confute this claim of the emulation of excellence by pointing to the many instances of slavish, fanatic following, by masses of people, of some of the worst leaders in history. But can we afford to rest with this refutation? To do so would be to accept that humans have such a large, innately irrational principle built into their behavior that the only way to preserve society would be through authoritarian trickery, as Godwin, alluding to Edmund Burke's faith in "salutary prejudices and useful delusions" (p.118), has already pointed out. This would mean that human reason, since it could not be used for the regulation of life, had discovered the most rational principles of society only to find them all "abortive" efforts. Thus the mind itself would have been some huge evolutionary error. The latter, in fact, is a thought Godwin wants us to face: if we become aware of the "havoc" that the human species exhibits under the rule of its political institutions, and if we assume that such chaos is "the unalterable allotment of our nature," then "the eminence of our rational faculties must be considered as rather an abortion than a substantial benefit..." (p.88). No doubt by now Nietzsche has considered that possibility for us. If we are satisfied with that line of inquiry, we can forget about any genuine connection between human reason and "benevolent intention."

But for the anarchist as well as for the democrat, or for anyone else who hopes for a more humane and genuinely free society, these are speculative, misanthropic conclusions not to be adopted. The emulation of the excellence of those who have benefited mankind, such as those who realized that slavery is wrong, is not guaranteed. But such emulation has happened some of the time, and it is our constructive task to find reasoned ways to encourage it.[2] Otherwise we allow the realization to go to waste.

Godwin's Value for Us, His Current Readers

There is of course much more in Godwin's great book, but it has not been my aim to provide a commentary upon it. That has already been well done by such scholars as Marshall and John P. Clark. What I have tried to convey is a way of reading *Political Justice* for our own time. Reading it over a period of time, taking within our selves some of its massiveness, is a very different experience than reading about it, or reading excerpts drawn from it. Reading *Political Justice* provides an extensive terrain in which to encounter and reconstruct a huge range of anarchist thinking about the basic relation between uncompromising intellectual freedom and non-authoritarian social organization. As far as I am aware, there is no other work in the anarchist tradition that can offer us this opportunity. By accepting both the labors and the delights of reading this book, we can still join with Godwin in his love of the "universal exercise of private judgment" (p.208), a principle which he finds "unspeakably beautiful." It is also one that remains central to anarchism.

Endnotes

[1] As for the motorcycle lovers, we could quote this Godwin statement: "According to the usual sentiment, every club assembling for any civil purpose...has a right to establish any provisions or ceremonies, no matter how ridiculous or detestable, provided they do not interfere with the freedom of others. Reason lies prostrate at their feet..." William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Modern Morals and Happiness*, ed. I. Kramnick, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985; p.196. All further page references to *Political Justice* refer to this edition.

Here Godwin is incautiously denying the sacredness of what has come to be called "negative freedom," although he even more strongly defends as the last fortress of reason, the right of individual private judgement. Undoubtedly there would be grave dangers in attempting any prohibition of the silly or mystifying conventions of various voluntary groups, and as anyone involved with anarchism would say, coercion must not be used for such an end. Godwin would be the last to deny each person his or her "sphere of discretion" (p.198). But he is also saying that humanity will continue to pay a huge price for the waste of energy that goes into uncritically accepted activities.

[2] Godwin would hardly have dreamt that today "the emulation of excellence" has become abstracted from its benevolent base. Thus every American child is encouraged to emulate the great professional athletes or/and the body-constructs of the advertising world, even though these have no value in alleviating the pressing problems of humanity and could well be harmful to such. I think of the "game-playing" mentality of the populace during the Gulf War, which treated the killing as a kind of sports contest; and, with regard to the emulation of advertisements, of the undergraduate student born in India who said that only in the past year had she come to accept that she would never look like those "ads." For Godwin, emulation is properly based on the admiration due to humane reasoning, not to hero-worship or mindless following.

Works Cited

Clark, John P. 1977. *The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Crowder, George. 1991. *Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin.* Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.

Godwin, William. 1985. *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Modern Morals and Happiness* ed. I. Kramnick. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Jones, Chris. 1993. *Radical Sensibility.* London: Routledge.

Marshall, Peter H. 1984. *William Godwin.* New Haven-London: Yale University Press.

Priestly, F. E. L. (ed.). 1946. *William Godwin's Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

St. Clair, William. 1989. *The Godwins and the Shelleys: A Biography of a Family.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.

IN MEMORY OF
DAVID WIECK
DECEMBER 13, 1921 – JULY 11, 1997

FROM

FRANK AND MARGARET ADAMS

David Thoreau Wieck

Sean Burns

David Thoreau Wieck was born into radicalism in the coal fields of southern Illinois. Both his mother and father were active in the labor movement and left wing politics. His father, Ed Wieck was a blacklisted coal miner and later, a researcher in industrial relations and mine safety. His mother, Agnes Burns Wieck, described as "the Mother Jones of Illinois," was a teacher, a journalist, an organizer of miners' wives, an advocate of rank and file union democracy and the President of the Women's Auxiliary of the Progressive Miner's of America. Agnes took a very young David to hear Eugene Debs speak upon Debs' release from prison. When David was ten he watched as his mother and 10,000 other miners' wives marched on the state capitol of Illinois. The politics and ideological clashes of the labor movement were part of his upbringing.

In the 1930's, David and his family moved to New York City. His father took a job with the Russell Sage Foundation. New York City in the thirties was an exciting time and place to be a young radical. As a high school student David joined the Young Communist League, raised money for the American League Against War and Fascism, and, with his parents, attended mass political meetings at Madison Square Garden . The move allowed David to expand his intellectual horizons far beyond the limits of his birthplace, Belleville, Illinois.

By 1936, at the age of 15, David lost interest in the communists and began seeking a less authoritarian political perspective. The war in Spain offered David exposure to the anarcho-syndicalists and soon his own curiosity took him to other anarchist inspirations; Kropotkin, Goldman and Berkman.

By 1938, with the world rushing into a most certain war, David, a student at Columbia University, made up his mind that he would resist the draft when the war came. Although many anarchists were split over the proper approach to take toward the war, David was firm. He would not participate in murderous violence as a condition of living in the human community. He felt no solidarity with an American government that turned a blind eye to the Republicans in Spain nor toward American businesses which supported fascism throughout the thirties. He would not participate in a war to guarantee the U.S. a greater economic role in the post war world. In 1943, after a brief flirtation with expatriation, David was convicted and sentenced for refusing draft induction and incarcerated at the Danbury Federal Penitentiary.

Danbury housed a number of war resistors including Ralph DiGia (of the War Resistor's League)and Lowell Naeve (an artist who wrote *A Field of Broken Stones*, a memoir of his experiences as a war resister that David edited). These war resisters were not content to simply sit the war out before resuming their commitment to human rights as there were issues to address even while behind bars. Eighteen resisters, including David, went on strike in the prison to protest racial segregation policies on the inside. The strike attracted some national press attention. Human Rights organizations joined the protest of Jim Crow laws in the Federal prison system. Unwilling to risk bad publicity during a time of "national racial solidarity," the federal government backed down and Danbury officials integrated the mess hall.

Not content to stop with this partial victory, David and seven others continued to refuse to participate with the prison regime at all. For this action they would remain in solitary confinement until their time was served. However, their agitation continued. They were able to negotiate open cell doors in the solitary wing and a hunger strike restored yard privileges. The time in solitary allowed David time to work on a history of the United Mine Workers (later it became his Masters' Thesis). Still, solitary and the depressing realities of prison took its toll on David's mood.

The end of the war brought hopes of release to the resisters. Unfortunately, the end of the war did not end the objector's incarceration nor the government's "lesson." More agitation both on the inside and the outside was necessary before the government discharged the war objectors. Sympathizers on the outside, including David's parents and members of the *Why?* anarchist group, protested at Danbury and at the White House. A committee to free the resisters was formed, chaired by A.J. Muste. Finally, the government simply tired of the agitation and kicked the remaining objectors out. On May 17, 1946 David was released.

Upon returning to New York, David became actively involved with the WHY? anarchist group and was a member of the editorial group of its publication, *Why? A Journal of Free Inquiry*. The *Why?* group concerned themselves with forming a modern day anarchism. By the post-war years the labor movement of David's parents' generation had little to offer these radicals. (David referred to the labor movement as a "practical necessity, at best.") He was concerned more with developing relationships of mutual aid and gaining a psychological understanding of the basis of acquiescence to authority and power. The members of the group were "hippies" ahead of their time. The group enjoyed the night life of New York and held parties to get the journal ready for mailing. The group sponsored the first public reading of James Baldwin's *Go Tell It on the Mountain* at the Spanish Anarchist Hall and published the writings of Paul Goodman, an active member of *Why?* and its editorial group while David was in jail, before either writer was recognized by the "intellectual left."

Toward the end of the forties the group slowly began to dissolve. Four of the original members, Dave Koven, Audrey Goodfriend, and Mike and Sally Grieg, left for San Francisco where they, along with other Berkeley pacifists and radicals, opened a progressive school, Walden, that is still operating. Others left to pursue their own interests and an infusion of "new blood" was not forthcoming. The journal's name was changed to *Resistance* and David continued on as sole editor until 1954 when he ceased its publication. The awful realities of German atrocities, the Atomic Bomb, the Cold War, the horrible reaction of the fifties and the toll of three years in prison led David to seek a less public and more personal way to engage in direct action. David continued to write, frequently contributing to *Liberation*, a pacifist monthly whose editors included A.J. Muste, David Dellinger, and Paul Goodman. He also returned to Columbia University to continue his education.

By 1960 David was a Professor of Philosophy at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in upstate New York. Relocation to a smaller community allowed (or forced) David to express his anarchism in a more personal way. He continued to organize anarchist groups and helped publish a local magazine. He continued to act as propagandist in the international anarchist community by writing for a number of journals, academic and otherwise. At the same time, he attempted to help students find their own path to liberation.

During the anti-war movement of the sixties, David was active locally, participating in groups and teach-ins. Unlike David Dellinger, a more famous WWII resister, David saw no national role of leadership for himself. (Leading was not his style.) David also found too many in the anti-war movement unwilling to criticize the state socialism of North Vietnam or to take a long term view of the necessities of revolution. However, because any public criticism or debate at the time would have only benefited the forces of reaction and war, the best thing was to be supportive.

By the mid-60's David was no longer a young radical. It was David's turn to act as mentor and teacher to younger radicals. Former student and colleague of David's, John Schumacher, describes David as a passionate teacher who saw teaching as an act of subversion:

> David was an inspiration to many people. He was a considerate person who did not seek a public persona. His principled life served as an example of the path to anarchism.

John credits his own radicalism to David's teaching and friendship. David continued to write, teach and help others with their work. He helped Giovanni Baldelli, writing the forward for Baldelli's book, *Social Anarchism.* David was helpful with the birth of the journal *Social Anarchism.* He and John Schumacher created a class at RPI that John continues to teach entitled *Anarchism in Everyday Life*. Too busy helping build communities of resistance, David had little time to reflect on his own role in radical history. However, a man who led a life of resistance and made direct action a habit is worthy of being held in our collective memory.

I met David Wieck only once. The occasion was a speaking engagement in central Illinois in 1985 when he was asked to speak about his mother, Agnes Burns Wieck, upon her induction into the Illinois Labor History Hall of Honor. David and his companion of fifty years, Diva Agostinelli Wieck, spent the evening with my parents. David was my father's cousin, his mother, my great aunt. I had heard quite a bit about Agnes, her husband Ed, and their involvement with the Progressive Miners of America's war with John L. Lewis and the UMW. At the time, I didn't know much about David and Diva, their anarchism and their life of principled resistance. The conversation that evening remained on family members long since past and I missed my opportunity to discuss radicalism and anarchism with the most radical branch of my family tree. Later, when my own understanding and interest had fully bloomed, that radical branch was losing its leaves. By then David was suffering from Alzheimer's disease and on July 1, 1997 he died.

Three weeks after David's death, I visited with Diva in their home in upstate New York. David's presence was clearly felt, not only in their home, but in the words of his life long companion. There was a simplicity and a normalcy in the life that she described. In some ways David lived a life far away from my relatives in the coal fields of Illinois but, his heart and his spirit, his connection with the good things in this world were very near.

David practiced a propaganda of principle to the very end. During his last days spent in a nursing home without the mental faculties that had served him his entire life, David continued to agitate. At a memorial meeting the nursing home holds every two months for deceased residents, a member of the staff, a young professional woman spoke about David:

> David came to us an Alzheimer's patient. When I asked him what he did, he said that he was a teacher. When I asked him what he taught, he said that he tried to get his students to think. From the stories I hear David got his students and friends to think. I know he got us to think. Thanks to David we changed the way we do some things. He was a real force.

For David direct action was a lifelong habit. Like the "worm in the wood," lives of refusal — like David's — may one day help bring down the state.

Anarchists Write

Each issue the editors select a topic and invite your contributions. This section is an open forum designed to get our readers to write informally about topics of significant concern.

For the next issue we have chosen the topic of **communal living.** The topic is intentionally broad. Tackle it directly or use it as a springboard. Writing style is not important—your openness, your thoughtfulness, your sincerity are the important ingredients. We will take care of the routine editing.

You can write a paragraph or you can write up to five pages.

All copy should be typed and doublespaced. (A disk copy with the word processing program clearly identified is also required.) You may use a pen name if it allows you to be more open. If you want us to acknowledge receiving your contribution, please include an addressed postcard or envelope with postage.

Send your submissions to:
Anarchists Write
Social Anarchism
2743 Maryland Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21218 USA
<sociala@nothingness.org>

Dianamania

John Moore

The labyrinth of power has many entrances but few exits, and many lost themselves within it. Should we feel pity for the lost as we ignite the flame that burns down its dry thickets?

Frankenstein's Monster. Created by the media, killed by the media, given an afterlife by the media. Meanwhile, a body lies bleeding, mangled in the machinery.

Media's children. Britons look into their tv mirrors, see themselves — dead — and mourn.

A vicarious death. In weeping for Diana, Britons subconsciously weep for their own deaths, their living deaths — the deaths of their hopes, dreams, desires.

A measure of vacuity. The more one mourns the death of one's masters, the more one affirms the evacuation of one's self.

An inverse ratio. The more repressed people are, the more hysteria lurks just below the surface waiting to erupt. The greater the obsession with privacy, the greater a people's prudery — but also their prurience.

The real tragedy of Diana's death remains the media-orchestrated spectacle of British slavishness and obedience to authority.

We all mourn. Like an ugly jingoistic mob, moral fascism stalks the land, policing this lie — belligerently glaring, righteously intimidating, and hysterically awaiting any hint of dissent — eagerly desiring an opportunity to pummel with disapproval.

Heard the sick joke about the death of Diana and Dodi? The institutions they symbolize — state and capital, respectively — still exist.

The events following Diana's demise: Albert Speer's finest hour.

Apotheosised as St. Diana, the "people's princess" joins the pantheon of the gods of New Labour.

Blair's project: modernisation; i.e., an intensified, more integrated form of capitalist totalitarianism. Diana is cast as the Queen of Hearts, virgin mother of a demonic child.

Hell's Spawn. The Rolling Stones on the Diana tribute album: from beggars banquet to monarch's wake; from Sympathy for the Devil (His Satanic Majesty) to Sympathy for the Queen of Heaven (Her Brittanic Majesty).

The new logo for UK PLC: "Charity shall cover the multitude of sins."

Contrary to all appearances, Britons yearn for human regeneration. Naïvely hoping that Diana's death would mean that nothing would ever be the same again, they feebly tried to effect apocalypse through public despondency and social passivity, then meekly returned to working and consuming. A very English, very reactionary equivalent of May 68 resulted merely in more of the same. Nothing changed, it just got worse. Ⓐ

Forecast

Partly wimpy.
Chance of someone fucking you over today.
Big vapid president on the horizon:
Your mother's going to call.

— Greta Harris

The Interview

Ellen Sander

No, I do not take my mask off for you.
Do not ask. Put down your camera and your pen
and sit. Your smell is so clean it makes
me weep, the slope of your neck and
your lips so earnest with curiosity
and middle class indignation.
How did you find me?

I love nothing but the blood of my enemies
their rage as we ravage their lies
the treachery when they turn on each other
each day that we make some small triumph
to stave off the butchery, the land grabbing and murder.
I could not love you.

I fight in the mountains with peasants for brothers
a dirt poor resistance of novenas and old weapons
the rich no longer want.
I fight in the city with a multicolored mass of
people whose life is so hard
staring fiercely at the monochrome of men in power.
Like whitecaps on a brackish sea
they could not float without the roil of the undertow.

You see their pictures in the news when they marry
when they achieve, when they scandalize.
They only show pictures of us when we die
or if we are arrested:
pictures in white papers on white waters
they whisper about us in white houses
where they pretend not to know what is done to us
with the money and weapons they send here
for the war on drugs.

We hover in clouds of dark smoke that rise
from bonfires after massacres
from the mass grave pits for the workers
from the polished offices of ideologues who pretend we
are not their doing or their problem.
We die in the red and brown dirt of our fields and
roads going by the hard labor or the poor.
They take even this, leaving nothing to live on
so the forests can become furniture
and the rivers made foul.

You must go now. I wish you well.
Do not write down where we are.
Because if your journey home is not safe
you will have brought more danger to me.

Dear Social Anarchism:

Thomas Martin opens a complex discussion on integrating Chaos and Dynamic Systems theory into political analysis ("Steps Toward a Post-Western Anarchism," #23). Combined with insights from radical ecology movements, these new areas of scientific study have already begun to transcend the limits of their own disciplines to influence the emergence of new philosophies, social movements, and our understanding of consciousness itself.

What value do these new revelations hold for radicals? Well, for one, they bring to the fore *questions* that we have been barely able to formulate, and hold out the possibility of dramatic leaps in consciousness that will enable us to answer them.

In recent years, and in line with the dominant ideology of Western science, it has been standard leftist fare to reduce, or "linearize," the dialectical interaction of what we see as isolated variables. (Sure, we give lip-service to their "interpenetration," but in reality we hardly have any idea what that means, other than a very vague understanding that "things impact on each other.") Thus, leftists have historically cited the limitations inherent in "the objective conditions" as the culprit whenever revolutionary movements don't succeed in seizing state power (assuming that that's even a desirable goal), or "the subjective factors" whenever the various social democratic parties sell us out —"the masses aren't ready," "it's not a revolutionary period," etc. But what exactly do we mean when we speak of "revolutionary periods," "objective conditions," or "subjective factors"? Those categories have been taken for granted by the Left for so long that they have become stale catchwords used to dismiss or rationalize complex or dynamic processes. They need to be re-examined.

When, for instance, does a revolutionary period begin? How much change does a particular period in capitalism have to undergo before it becomes a recognizably new period, requiring new strategies for change? What are its components? Does it exist "objectively," independent of activists' perception, let alone influence? If so, is our activity necessary to bring it about? What do we do in non-revolutionary periods that would be different, as strategies and tactics, than what we'd do in revolutionary ones and how do we organize ourselves accordingly to achieve those different goals?

These questions are hardly limited to problems in understanding the transformation from non-revolutionary to revolutionary periods, but extend to *ev*olution as well, the transformation of *anything* into something else. Take Darwin's great leap: the transformation of populations of a particular kind of animal or plant into *a new species*. Darwin explained this transformation brilliantly, in a new way: the "invisible hand" of natural selection (as in Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of the emerging capitalist market) gives the appearance of someone or some force "selecting for certain characteristics" over a wide quantity of chance variations in a population, eventuating in qualitatively new species, but (according to Darwin) in actuality it is just the population propagating *itself*. Those having more surviving offspring eventually expand the numbers in the population having their characteristics. Thus, should environment, disease, natural enemy or any other situation serve to limit organisms with one characteristic more than others, nature could be seen as privileging—or "selecting for"—organisms with the characteristics that eventually emerge—an analysis that, in its time, blew apart the dominant Christian paradigm of pre-determined species made by God.

But was this as definitive a refutation of Christianity as it once seemed, let alone of Lamarck's construct of the transmission of acquired characteristics in individuals? "In the wild, in breeding, and in artificial life, we see the emergence of variation," as Darwin discussed; "but we also clearly see the limits of variation narrowly bounded, and often bounded within species. No one has yet witnessed, in the fossil record, real life, or computer life, the exact transitional moments when the system of evolution pumps its complexity up to the next level. There is a suspicious barrier in the vicinity of species that either holds change back or removes it from our sight. As the French evolutionist Pierre Grasse said, 'Variation is one thing, evolution quite another; this cannot be emphasized strongly enough... Mutations provide change, but not progress.'"(Kevin Kelly, "Deep Evolution: The Emergence of Postdarwinism," *Whole Earth Review*, Fall 1992.) Exactly when and how do new species emerge, new qualities, from the plethora of quantifiable variations?

Chaos and dynamic systems theory is giving rise to new interpretations of this 150-year-old debate, *not* by reasserting Christianity's dogmatic claim for the making of species or Lamarck's for individual heredity, but by re-examining *the questions* those frameworks were grappling with through new eyes. Both Darwin and Lamarck, let me point out, devised mechanisms that worked (correctly or not) over *qualitatively different layers of complexity*—Darwin, on populations (and not the individuals making it up—horizontal array); Lamarck, on individuals inheriting acquired traits (vertical array). Darwin's mechanism worked, in a way, like insurance statistics today: You could tell a great deal about populations—how many people will die of heart attacks during the month of July in Lower Manhattan, for example, and even refine it further to sex, race, age group, etc. But if a particular individual asks: "Will *I* get a heart attack in Lower Manhattan during the month of July?" the mechanism has nothing to say. Because both Darwin's and Lamarck's mechanisms found expression in the characteristics of the population—that is, as *new qualities* (new species)—the collision of their paradigms, so long as constructed within the same level of complexity, was inevitable. But is there nothing more to be learned than "one was right and the other was wrong"?

Utilizing the new sciences, we can now look at relationships between different levels of complexity—molecular, cellular, organismic, class, ecosystemic and planetary, each qualitatively different and discretely organized—and begin to understand how what occurs in one level is sometimes "sealed off" from, and sometimes impacts on and is co-determined by what happens on other levels. In general, we incorrectly apply ways of seeing pertinent to events on one level to other levels and the movement between them, assuming a uniformitarianism—the general validity and application of the same "laws" over time and dimensionality—to, for example, attempts to account for the direction of a particular electron in a given place and time. From our macro perspective it does seem "logical" that we be able to do so; but as it turns out, nature does not work that way.

Over time, we've learned that events in levels that we really didn't know about previously (such as that of the genes) are not determining entities, as believed by, for instance, Hawkins in his popular book *The Selfish Gene*, but depend upon and interact with the surrounding macro environment—in this case, the chemistry of the cell—in ways that do to Darwin what his paradigm did to Lamarck! Note, for example, the Mississippi alligator: eggs that develop in the temperature range 26–30% C hatch females; take the same eggs, with nothing else changed, raise the temperature to between 34–36% C, and they will hatch only males. Eggs that develop between 31–33% C produce alligators of either sex, with the probabilities changing from female to male as the temperature rises. (Temperature itself changes for each egg based on, among other variables, the egg's location within the nest.) The sex of the individual alligator, as well as the sexual dispersal over the population, is determined in each egg by the intersection of variables from different levels: temperature, genes, location of the egg in the nest, and environment within the eggs.

The new sciences of chaos and dynamic systems theory are making headway in understanding multi-level interaction, holding revelatory implications not only for the particular framework but for the way we think and the political work we do. They can help us ascertain the boundaries (or limits) of levels, the processes by which chaos organizes itself into recognizable patterns (new qualities) which self-develop, the relationships that exist among qualities within particular levels as they negate and supercede, and the process by which measurable qualities generate new qualities, which themselves become quantities in a higher-level process—to use the old phrase, the way they "dialectically leap" dimensions—the missing territory in understanding process and motion. We are inventing a new calculus of natural and, hopefully, political transformation.

These concerns are not necessarily new. Dialectical philosophy has long discussed the transformation of slave societies into feudalism, feudalism into capitalism and, eventually capitalism into socialism. All of these temporarily stable (yet increasingly dynamic) forms, each with their own contradictions, characterized whole social and economic epochs within the history of class society in general. The debates over *how* such transformations took place, what order they took place in, did they indeed succeed each other sequentially at all (or does it only seem that way after the fact?), why did class society itself emerge and how, and what is the role of understanding—consciousness—of historic macro processes in future transformations, are all still being debated today. It seems unavoidable that we begin questioning similar processes *within* capitalism as well, questions concerning the transformation of one period within capitalism to another. Yet, until now, no one has done that. The questions are similar as before: How do we recognize a new period, revolutionary or otherwise? What criteria are valid? All, as before, are subsets of more general philosophical considerations: When and how does *anything* become anything else? How do we know when it does? And, how do we frame this question without falling into the pounding of Kant's "categorical imperative"?

Most leftists assume that a certain amount of quantity piling up produces (either on its own or with our help), new objective qualities—another way of saying that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. What exactly does that mean? Is it indeed the case? How, exactly, does one quality differ from another quality? What is the role of quantity in that? How do changes at the micro-level impact the macro, and vice-versa?

We know that there is a relationship between the objective conditions of our lives and the ways we think and feel; but, when it comes to political and social action, the objective and subjective are often worlds apart. What is objective, what is subjective, is the separation of the two legitimate, and what is the history of that separation? How can one avoid the Enlightenment's baneful legacy of conceptualizing the world in terms of such false dualities? (For more on this question, see *The Re-Enchantment of the World*, by Morris Berman; *Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing*, by Alison Jaggar and Susan Bordo; *The Dialectical Biologist*, by Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin; *Beyond Bookchin: Preface for a Future Social Ecology* by David Watson; and "Deep Evolution: The Emergence of Postdarwinism" by Kevin Kelly.) What kinds of different strategies for social revolution would emerge as we learn to think non-dualistically? Is that even possible? Would we even still be thinking in terms of "strategies" at all?

We also know that our situation constrains even the questions we think to ask—including the ways we perceive that very situation. Yet, leftists have yet to see the importance of transforming our situation so that we would be in a position to ask the kind of questions we need to ask, let alone be able to answer them. As a result, we always end up racing to catch up with changes that have already occurred, forever chasing the bus down the avenue of luck. ("I just chased the bus all the way home and saved $1.50," my roommate once beamed, proudly. To which I responded: "Schmuck! Why didn't you run home behind a taxi-cab and save $9?!") Why are we always playing "catch-up"? Because we have no general, systematic set of criteria for understanding movement, especially the motion of capitalism at transitional junctures as it begins to leave one period and enter another, and what that new period is based on. Our problem is not finding ways to move faster and faster. It's to leap out of that paradigm altogether. We need to begin thinking about such creatures as "revolutionary periods," "objective conditions," and "subjective factors" in new and more holistic, non-reductionist ways. These cannot be found in the approaches of Western science, anarchism, or post-Marx Marxism (what Engels calls "scientific" socialism) as understood and practiced thus far. The problem, philosophically, is one of "motion": the transformation of something into something else: an appreciation of qualities, how they arise and how we know them when they do.

Instead, we too often fall back—without realizing it, usually—into a form of positivism known as "stage theory," and into relying upon labels, assumed categories, "common sense" frameworks based on false dualities, and clichés. Consequently, using the old "rationalized" ways of thinking in which we are trapped, the Left has been unable to keep pace with, on the one hand, the rapid globalization of capital (spatially) and, on the other, its real domination, suddenly (across dimensional complexity), over ever-greater facets of daily life including the privatization and exploitation of the genetic code itself. The genetic determinist paradigm which dominates capitalist science is the primary means through which this happens, these days, a form of reductionist materialism in which particular molecular configurations are said to *determine* all sorts of events, characteristics and behavior of the greater organism, including people. And so we have the claim that genes, 1) determine most features of an individual's physiognomy (including the brain); and 2) thereby determine their consciousness and behavior. The federally funded Violence Initiative Project, for example, is searching for "the gene that causes criminal behavior."

Many, including some gay groups, are touting the idea that homosexuality is "genetically based." (It's not.) From such a reductionist model (which is a ruling framework of our society) there is no basis for understanding where social behavior, let alone consciousness—undoubtedly irreducible to its cellular parts and neuron networks—comes from. Or, is consciousness simply an electric current, with an exaggerated sense of its own importance?

Things were not always this way. The view of nature which predominated in the West down to the eve of the Scientific Revolution, writes Morris Berman in *The Re-Enchantment of the World*, was totally different than the framework through which we see things today.

"[It] was that of an enchanted world. Rocks, trees, rivers and clouds were all seen as wondrous, alive, and human beings felt at home in this environment. The cosmos, in short, was a place of *belonging*. A member of this cosmos was not an alienated observer of it but a direct participant in its drama. His [sic] personal destiny was bound up with its destiny, and this relationship gave meaning to his life. This type of consciousness—what I shall refer to in this book as "participating consciousness"—involves merger, or identification, with one's surroundings, and bespeaks a psychic wholeness that has long since passed from the scene. Alchemy, as it turns out, was the last great coherent expression of participating consciousness in the West.

"....[Science, as the dominant mode of thinking in the current epoch] can best be described as disenchantment, nonparticipation, for it insists on a rigid distinction between observer and observed. Scientific consciousness is alienated consciousness; there is no ecstatic merger with nature, but rather total separation from it. Subject and object are always seen in opposition to each other. I am not my experiences, and thus not really a part of the world around me. The logical end point of this world view is a feeling of total reification: everything is an object, alien, not-me; and I am ultimately an object too, an alienated "thing" in a world of other, equally meaningless things. This world is not of my own making; the cosmos cares nothing for me, and I do not really feel a sense of belonging to it. What I feel, in fact, is a sickness in the soul." (Morris Berman, *The Re-Enchantment of the World*, Bantam Books, 1984.)

To our detriment, however, radicals have not been particularly perceptive in observing what has been *lost* as capitalism came to dominate the world, which is seen by many as a progressive historical stage despite "abuses" (such as genocide, slavery, colonization, etc.) without which "the next stage"—anarchism, or communism—would be impossible. Analytical thought, essential to capitalism's reduction of everything to the realm of *quantifiability*, assumes and upholds an "objective" detached stance from which to view the world, further separating subject from object and *losing* whatever traces of participatory non-neurotic ways of being that once flourished. The Neurotic—which is, after all, almost everyone in this culture—fetishizes that separation and, consequently, the source of his or her own neurosis. The duality is not only maintained "logically"; it reproduces itself in us emotionally; we actually fear transcending it, rejecting what participatory consciousness would mean and failing to appreciate the beauty of what has been lost.

In so doing, we perpetually undermine the revolutionary movements we participate in and, sadly, our ability to transform the world.

Perhaps we are about to come out of the long national nightmare of philosophical stagnation. New conceptualizations and methodological approaches do appear promising: "Fractals," for instance, are self-referential mathematical maps in which each part contains and reproduces the whole within it, no matter how small it is sliced. (These are discussed in *Chaos: Making a New Science*, by James Gleick.) Self-referential (or "recursive") operations and philosophies are also discussed—brilliantly, in my opinion—in *Gödel, Escher and Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid*, by Douglas Hofstadter, and are precursors to the emergence of a full- fledged, truly dialectical philosophy. And, in his award-winning book, *How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity*, Brian Goodwin offers the first readable account of the spontaneous self-organization of living (and even non-living) biological *fields*, in which what counts "is not the nature of the molecules and other components involved, such as cells, but the way these interact with one another in time (their kinetics) and in space (their relational order— how the state of one region depends on the states of neighboring regions). ... This is the emphasis on self-organization, the capacity of these fields to generate patterns spontaneously, *without any specific instructions telling them what to do, as in a genetic program.* These systems produce something out of nothing, no plan, no blueprint, no instructions about the pattern that emerges." (P.51) These patterns "cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the properties of the component parts in isolation. To understand these complex nonlinear dynamic systems it is necessary to study both the whole and its parts, and to be prepared for surprises due to the emergence of unexpected behavior," (77-78) as enumerated elegantly in the writings of Stephen Jay Gould.

From such arcane beginnings we can usefully plumb these new developments to understand the tension between the ever-expanding value-creating abilities of workers and their negation and the reappropriation in the production process (via capitalism's private accumulation of value) which goes on constantly in every work day, in every part of every work day and, contrary to Engels and aft (in whose expositions the division between necessary and surplus labor is walled-off into discrete categories or "stages"—antecedent of the historical theory of "stages," or Stalinism), in every fragment of every fragment of every moment, simultaneously creating and negating, producing and consuming, objectifying and subjectivizing, freeing and determining, and particularizing and universalizing.

How can these contradictory processes go on at the same time in the same place with the same material? How is self organization possible?

Even in discussing the relationship of consciousness and subjectivity to politics—all to rare, as it is—we objectify that relationship to begin with; we look at subjectivity “objectively”: What are the conditions in which people become conscious of their own role in history, etc. In so doing we reproduce that duality even as we strive to transcend it, therein undermining the possibility of radically transforming our conditions despite whatever new information we gain.

“Because disenchantment is intrinsic to the scientific world view,” writes Berman, “the modern epoch contained, from its inception, an inherent instability that severely limited its ability to sustain itself for more than a few centuries. For more than 99 percent of human history, the world was enchanted and man saw himself as an integral part of it. The complete reversal of this perception in a mere four hundred years or so has destroyed the continuity of the human experience and the integrity of the human psyche. It has very nearly wrecked the planet as well. The only hope, or so it seems to me, lies in a reenchantment of the world.”

And that reenchantment begins, I think, in the self-organization of dynamic systems, of which our consciousness and our actions (conscious or not) are a part. Tom Martin points us in the right direction. As I have very little in the way of mental and social tools to understand how, from chaos, self-organization can (and often does) emerge. Opening the question, as Tom has done, is excellent. As in anything, however, the devil is in the details. And we haven’t much time.

— Mitchel Cohen

HOW BROAD AND DEEP IS ANARCHISM?

Kingsley Widmer

Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism, An Unbridgeable Chasm, has, in spite of its generally retrograde ways, some good points to score. But Bookchin's venomous, and humorless, blowing-up of his enemies—apparently all living anarchists except the master of a certain old socialist anarchism (aka Murray Bookchin), including some who have only partially praised him—self implodes. Other anarchists, according to Bookchin, repeatedly display assumptions that are "infantile" and "fascistic," among other ancient curses. ("Political infantilism" was a favorite epithet of Leninists, "social fascism" of Stalinists and fellow-traveling "progressives" in the Thirties.) The opening "Note to the Reader" warns that "thousands of self-styled anarchists" have surrendered to decadent bourgeois egotism and its utterly trivial yet deeply nihilistic "lifestyle" doctrines. This monograph-length polemic concludes that all such individualisms may unite with "fascistic lumpens," with you-know-what horrors. In sum, most contemporary anarchisms grow only evil.

True anarchists, Bookchin holds, always recognized that individualized freedoms, alienated egotisms, defiant exceptionalisms, and the demands for personal autonomy serve capitalism. That, according to his brief historical citations, properly eliminates much long associated with anarchism, including William Godwin, Max Stirner, Friedreich Nietzsche, and Paul Goodman, among others. Their thousands of contemporary descendants merely go further into "infantilized egotism" and serve the "'libertarian' Ecstasy Industry." They reveal themselves as "irate" and "vaporous" and "self-indulgent" squirming "petty bourgeois" who support and encourage "capitalism." And not least in their little publishing groups, communes, co-ops, art avant-gardes, collectives, schools, etc. All these efforts, which I take to be much of positive contemporary libertarianism, Bookchin sees as merely "titillation" for the petty bourgeois. So goes much of Bookchin's self-indulgently irate and egotistical polemic as the exclusive shopkeeper of genuine socialist anarchism.

Curiously, Bookchins's repeated charges against other anarchists that they are "lumpen" and "petty bourgeois" just recycle antique authoritarian Marxist curses. If I recall the historical record correctly, they were first heavily used to denounce Baukunin (a hero to Bookchin) and his support among the Swiss watchmakers and the socially marginal poor. Elsewhere, Bookchin himself criticized the Marxist mythology of the industrial proletariat as the only true agent of social change and revolutionary rectitude. Social realism, as well as many anarchists since at least Baukunin, suggest that marginal groups (students, prisoners, the outclassed, hobos, dissident intellectuals, sexual and cultural rebels, ethnic minorities, institutional deserters, et al) as not only more likely agents of change but the contexts of most anarchists.

Granted, Bookchin adds another set of curses against the individualist-lumpen-petty bourgeois contemporary anarchists: anti-technological primitivists. He repeatedly charges them with not only social and personality destructiveness unto defeat of all "coherence," chaos instead of anarchy, but with a "return to animality" and retreat "into the shadowy world of brutishness." For Bookchin, "the regression to primitivism among lifestyle anarchists denies the ... emancipatory aspects of Euro-American civilization." Their anti-views spread antithetical to anarchism and against "the expanding ideals of freedom." By a selfish and "mystical" obfuscation they serve not so much to destroy the true Satan, market capitalism, as all of civilization: reason, labor-saving machines, good taste, science, civil discourse, longevity, innovation, moral improvement, health, social progress—indeed, the very processes of social and cultural "evolution."

Those acquainted with Bookchin's dubious interpretation of biological evolution, in his writings on ecology, as a dialectical culmination in complexity and *homo sapiens*, will recognize its continuation here in what he calls "secondary evolution." His crucial and pervasive faith and dogma is that great Nineteenth Century idol, Progress.

Bookchin stands in lonely splendor, though on the ghostly shoulders of Baukunin, Kropotkin, and their descendants in such as the Spanish anarchists of more than two generations ago, defending not only true anarchism but its matrix of Western Civilization and its metaphysics of Progress. For biological evolution, a variety of neoDarwinists have long undercut such progressive evolutionary hierarchy (or the evolutionary tree-with-man-at-the-top, as liberal Darwinist Stephen Jay Gould puts it). A variety of historians and social theorists and cultural critics have rather thoroughly exposed many of the falsities, and not only the Eurocentric, of the "progressive" models of civilization. Bookchin will have none of it in holding to an antique model of anarchism as an old-fashioned revolutionary carrying out of evolutionary progress in sociopolitical organization.

Does that insistent but pervasively dubious emphasis negate all his specific criticisms of other anarchists? Of course not. While rarely unvenemous, much less contextual or fair, Bookchin does have some points that merit consideration when he goes beyond a couple sentences of slash-and-burn of other anarchists. A half-dozen pages splutter on Hakim Bey (aka Peter Lamborn Wilson) whose "manic narcissism" in defense of "bohemian" anarchism appears in his *T.A.Z. Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchism, Poetic Terrorism.* Certainly Bookchin suggests a case against that for "mystic" irrationality and moral irresponsibility—anyway, for some pretentious silliness. T.A.Z. focuses anarchist resistance and change on the occasional and celebratory moments "where he and she can briefly experience total freedom" (Bey). Bookchin may be partly right in his main charge that decadent super-capitalism can readily absorb, neutralize, and perhaps even exploit such lifestyle libertarianism. Contra-Bookchin, I doubt that anarchists should judge primarily on the basis of predictive historical dogmatism, so often wrong. But, to my sense of history, the repeated eruptions of rebellious lifestyles for more than two millennia show one of the better traditions of Western Civilization. They should be defended and encouraged, especially by the libertarian minded, though perhaps with some discrimination. While they probably come out insufficient to largely change the dominant system, liberatory lifestyles certainly have had some desirable social effects, both immediate and long run. May the efforts at autonomous zones, whether in communal and collective small projects or rebellious styles, long recur! (Imitating Bookchinian annotation, let me note that I have developed the argument in a number of books, though commentators haven't properly appreciated it.)

While Bookchin also wants to intellectually torch the *Fifth Estate* anarchist group for similar "ecstasy" lifestyle politics of irrationalism and irrelevance, his attack centers on some of the anti-technology arguments of George Bradford (aka David Watson). In summary, Bradford's arguments hold that "mass technics"—the whole of organized expanding technological dominations; what some call the "megamachine society" and others "technocracy"—have become a total false environment and social system, and must be stopped. Bookchin counters thus:

> Bradford imparts to machines and "mass technics" a mystical autonomy that, like the Stalinist hypostatization of technology, has served extremely reactionary ends. The idea that technology has a life of its own is deeply rooted in the conservative German romanticism of the last century and in writings of Martin Heidegger and Friedreich George Junger, which fed into National Socialist ideology .

Even ignoring the gratuitous nastiness of yoking an earnest anarchist opponent with Stalin and Hitler, which Bookchin also does with others he disagrees with, the supposed intellectual history drastically misleads. A quite differently used anti-technological vision, for last century examples, was strong in the English Romantics and the American Transcendentalists, but no doubt Bookchin considers William Blake and Henry David Thoreau just more of those pernicious "ecstasy lifestyle" petty bourgeois individualists. Many other intellectual heritages also more directly reside behind contemporary anti-tech views, such as political-artist-utopian William Morris, who wanted to completely remove not only Nineteenth century industry and cities but its materials, rebuilding all the iron bridges over the Thames with handcrafted oak and stone. Such a horrible primitivizing! I mention Morris because in other contexts Bookchin considers him as heroic in his libertarian socialism. But one could go on and on about Bookchin's intellectual sleight-of-tradition against his anarchist opponents. Nasty rejection is all.

A possibly more debatable issue might be Bookchin's charge that the anti-technics proponents have "hypostatized technology" when the sole evil resides in the exploitative social relations of market capitalism, which Bookchin rather hypostatizes. Should we envision, say, aircraft carrier groups and nuclear power systems and vast space programs run by free and egalitarian humane sized communities? (I pick these three monstrous white elephants of high-technology, prone to dysfunction, since they don't operate very well even in capitalist-market terms, much less free social and ecological terms.) Bookchin's quasi-Marxism —"the primary role of the market and competition" in forming all of modern culture and society; "social and ecological crises" basically caused by "commodity relationships"— seems only secondarily libertarian, especially when it comes to technology. But even he draws back for a moment: "Which is not to deny that many technologies are inherently domineering and ecologically dangerous...." Which, enlarged, is what the libertarian anti-technologists are saying. Ah, but Bookchin has a twist; "the *commodity* relation expanded to its full historical proportions" produced them. Reifying "capitalism" wins the argument!

Except it doesn't really, for other than ancient libertarian-socialist faithful. Technological systems have long gone beyond property and commodity relations, though the capitalist-minded will certainly try to expand and exploit them, in their dominations and destructions. Bookchin has not even suggested what level and style of technology would be appropriate to an environmentally sustainable egalitarian and free society. Because, as he admits in a later footnote, "Anyone who advises us to significantly...reduce our technology is also advising us...to go back to the 'stone age'.... "Apparently we dare do nothing about our many "inherently" dominating and destructive technologies. Such a bleak anarchist view might encourage us in our despair to go party with Hakim Bey in a Temporary Autonomous Zone.

The most sustained part of Bookchin's monograph becomes an attack on the "stone age" primitivistic anarchists, moving from Bradford "to John Zerzan, the anticivilizational primitivist par excellence," author of *Future Primitive*. Instead of listing where he gets Zerzan distorted or wrong (including a gross misreading of his sarcasm), let me note that while the vituperation continues, Bookchin has been incited to add some significant evidence from reading anthropological studies. He seems eruditely correct that such as Bradford and Zerzan badly over-generalize the anthropological materials, lumping together different peoples, times, cultures, and conditions. While admitting that most "cultures in the Paleolithic were probably relatively egalitarian"—certainly one of the main appeals to anarchists—some were not. Hierarchy (on which Bookchin has written interestingly in other works) certainly developed early. So did destruction of the environment. So, after exhausting habitat, did conflict for resources from other peoples. Health was often bad, life short. What Bookchin elsewhere qualifiedly praised as "organic societies," appear here in mostly negative terms. Instead of benign primitivism, Bookchin gives us something close to arch-conservative Hobbes' "nasty, mean, brutish, and short."

Which is true? Both, I more than suspect. Let me enter here a tentative other view, having been recently guided through some variety of studies by an archeologist and an anthropologist. Probably many hunter/gatherer societies were egalitarian, generally peaceful, living an unexhausting and unanxious communal life in considerable harmony with their environment. But, as Bookchin cites, and as other studies I have seen tend to confirm, they repeatedly suffered greatly, even unto destruction, from natural calamities, invasions, *and*—little emphasized by either the primitivists or Bookchin—from internal weaknesses resulting from technological change (drastic rise or fall in tools and weapons, from a variety of causes), and, especially, over-population.

While I had half-expected to find that a sacral sense of nature and various taboos kept indigenous people in continuing harmony with their habitat, as some have contended, there now appears considerable evidence (some cited by Bookchin, some disputed), that it repeatedly did not work. We have good reasons to frequently doubt arguments for "ecological Noble Savages." Often they over-hunted, over-burned, over-specialized, over-ruled, and overpopulated. Not all of this can be blamed on the so-called advancing/invading "civilizations," which did the same destructiveness, and more, accelerated. With much more sympathy than Bookchin for the primitivizing anarchists, I still must agree with some of his criticisms of their overdone arguments. But neither side in the disputes seems at all clear in recognizing some major social conclusions, such as that a sustainable, egalitarian, humane society must drastically limit not only its property and market commodification, but its technology and population. A Bookchinian left-socialist order dominated by megamachines and over-population may make (to use his sort of comparison) Twentieth Century totalitarianism look nice.

Does anti-megamachine, primitivizing "lifestyle anarchism" mean the end, as Bookchin has it, of "Euro-American civilization"? His answer seems historically and culturally weak. Since Neolithic times Western culture repeatedly displays strong revivals of the primitive—one of its major characteristics. Perhaps partly an expression of loss of more simple, benign and organic societies, it certainly also served as rebellious counterings to dominant forms. Dionysian defiances, Golden Age mythologies, "pastoral" alternatives, and millennia of utopian art and schemes carry the primitivizing. Current libertarianism again displays versions of recurring "hard primitivism" (even as partly defined by that most rational of historians, A. O. Lovejoy, a couple of generations ago). It is one of the creative responses of high Western Civilization, and a better dynamic than many of its others. Primitivism should be understood more as a liberating cultural critique and rebellion than as a political blueprint.

Certainly we can argue about current primitivism's shape, details, logic and social aesthetics. We might also argue that if Euro-American civilization remains truly civilized, and worth saving, it will absorb far more of the primitivists demands for simpler, sustainable, egalitarian, anti-technocratic, humane societies. For that, I take it, is much of what they are about. If Euro-American civilization is not redeemable in some such ways, let us hope that there will be some anarchist communes—enduring Autonomous Zones practicing Paleolithic virtues?—in the new wilderness of ruins. (We mean old bookish men are not likely to be there.)

Bookchin charges those other anarchists with various kinds of ignorance and anti-intellectualism, and generally with a denial of "the very grounds of nuanced and mediated reflection." While this polemic frequently does not itself well qualify as informed and nuanced and mediated reflection, I atheistically sympathize with its slashes at superstition, such as fashionable New Age religiosity and "quietistic Asian theisms." But mediated libertarian reflection pushes me to recall such as the *social* libertarian importance of various antinomian movements, Tolstoyean Christianity, Ghandianism, and others, including admirable anarchists who claimed (non-theistic and non-authoritarian) Taoism. But all such matters really serve as backfires in an inquisitional burning which allows only one tradition and style of anarchism.

Bookchin's fourfold catechism: "a confederation of decentralized municipalities [could end as a mere formalism?]; an unwavering opposition to statism [what of other authoritarianism?]; a belief in direct democracy [but, elsewhere, he dubiously insists that this be majoritarian institutions]; and a vision [but, like Marx, no immediate realization?] of a libertarian communist society." That certainly was a major direction of some Nineteenth Century anarchism, Baukunin-Kropotkin and aftereffects, but hardly all of anarchism, then, and certainly not now. Since Bookchin has elsewhere argued that "emancipatory" ideas evolve, that historical dialectics unfold in Hegelian endlessness, and that the very mark of civilized humanity and evolution depends on change (he uses this to justify endless technological domination), he should apply it to his own antique left-socialism as a dogmatically exclusionary political movement.

Instead, Bookchin tacks on an essay of scattered political pronouncements, "The Left That Was," in irascible defense of former leftism, of which in fact the libertarian was usually only a small part. Its most recent heroic figure seems to be left-Communist Rosa Luxemburg (d. 1919). Its defining principles: "internationalism, democracy, anti-militarism, revolution, secularism, and rationalism," combined with varieties of anti-capitalist socialism and Enlightenment moral universalism—abstractly broad but narrow in practice. "Totally alien" to it, he claims, are most of the residual "leftists" of today, especially "pacifists," gender and ethnic "parochialists," academic postmodern "nihilists," and just about everybody else around, and their "pap." Certainly he is right about the dangerous "statism" of much of what currently passes as "leftism," and related egalitarianism, but, since at least the Jacobins, hasn't that usually been so? What Bookchin propounds overall seems a sometimes admirable but now narrow and thin libertarianism of a different time and place and conditions. To put it kindly, much of Bookchinism steams with quaintness. I counter-suggest that anarchism should be more openly various, and more critical of much of what passes for civilization, in our dedication to the fullest freedom and equality.

Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism, An Unbridgeable Chasm by Murray Bookchin, 86 pages. San Francisco: AK Press, 1995. Paper, $7.95.

Reviews

Martin Sprouse, editor.

Sabotage in the American Workplace: Anecdotes of Dissatisfaction, Mischief and Revenge

Reviewer: Levon Chorbajian

At the academic hell hole where I work, the current buzzwords are mission, productivity enhancement, and service (to the highest bidder with a few noblesse oblige charity projects thrown in to make it look good), Alienation, as you can probably guess, is not a current buzzword. It's only reflected in the conversations, facial expressions, and demeanors of many of the employees.

In 1987 Martin Sprouse needed a job and fell into a hell hole of his own. He accepted a position for $4.75 an hour working in the mail room of a San Francisco based financial magazine. Sprouse soon discovered that nearly everyone hated the place as much as he did. People dealt with their situation by treating the postage machine, phone line, and company expense account as part of the public domain. Office supplies were pilfered regularly, and there were furniture items and computers which vanished. Extended lunch hours and indifferent work habits were *de rigueur*. When word came down of across the board pay cuts, the water cooler was spiked with bubble bath.

This experience became the inspiration for *Sabotage in the American Workplace*. Sprouse decided "to document reactions to the day-to-day frustrations and conflicts of earning a living in America." The bulk of the book consists of anecdotes Sprouse gathered from a wide variety of workers about their employment experiences. Sprouse found his interviewees by running a newspaper ad and by tracing down people whose acts of sabotage had been reported in newspapers.

Primarily though, Sprouse put out the word and relied on others to spread it. Eventually, he came up with over 130 usable interviews which are grouped by employment sectors, that is, transportation, computers, hotel, construction, manufacturing, government, retail, etc.

Tracy Cox's dreamlike, quasi-Cubo/futuristic drawings lend a sinister, and sometimes humorous, dimension to this attractively laid out large format book. The pages are divided into vertical thirds. Two-thirds of each page presents a saboteur case history. The remaining portion is reserved either for a drawing by Cox or a quote, poem, proverb, or statistic relating to work and sabotage. Sprouse writes that "some of these items are opinions, facts, or have historical value, while others are included because of their absurdity." Here is a sampling of some of the shorter ones:

> Henry Ford—The assembly line is a haven for those who haven't got the brains to do anything else.
>
> Duc François De La Rochefoucauld—It is very clever to know how to hide one's cleverness.
>
> Franklin P. Jones—Maybe they call it take home pay because there is no other place you can afford to go with it.
>
> Don Marquis—When a man tells you he got rich through hard work, ask him whose.
>
> Jack Miller, IWW—Direct action means you gain all of your objectives on the job instead of at the ballot box.

The most common form of sabotage reported in this volume is theft followed by shutting down production lines and damaging equipment. There is also a good deal of malingering, working to rule, and general, all-around Schweikism. Workers also give away products or services or discount prices they consider unfair. Some do their own free lance work on the job using the employer's equipment and supplies. Others quit at the peak of business activity, leaving their bosses high and dry. Few of these workers express any remorse. Many, in fact, report a rush of exhilaration that they are able to savor, in some cases, for years.

All of these workers are motivated by deep-seated grievances which include nonpayment for work, low wages, broken promises, yelling and other abuse, rip-off prices, overcharges, dangerous equipment, and racism. One respondent, a waiter, is downright preemptory in his attitude:

I always steal from work because no matter how great the place is, they're always going to fuck you over at some point. It's just a question of when. I'm usually taking stuff way before the boss even starts yelling at me. It's like getting your revenge in advance.(p. 125)

Sabotage has a very long tradition. It has been around as long as exploitation and thus predates capitalism. Like Sprouse, I have no ethical problem with sabotage in principle, nor with most of the case histories reported in this book. (I do admit to being tested by a remorseless waitress who served spoiled food to destroy her boss's reputation and drive him out of business.) Nearly all of the people in this volume are motivated by a commitment to service, fairness, and justice. In these vicious, myopic, and destructive times, it is refreshing to read this book and learn of people who see clearly and act on it. On the down side, though, I cannot help thinking that sabotage can complement democratic mass organization and collective struggle but cannot substitute for them. Sabotage, in other words, has its redistributive effects and psychic satisfactions but also its limitations. These comments go beyond the intent of Sprouse's book, and are perhaps unfair, but I do think it is important to place the issue in a broader perspective than Sprouse does himself. If we take Sprouse on his own terms (which is the fairest way to do it), I can say that his effort has produced a lively and informative book on sabotage at a very attractive price. Bravo!

Sabotage in the American Workplace: Anecdotes of Dissatisfaction, Mischief, and Revenge edited by Martin Sprouse. 175 pp. San Francisco: Pressure Drop Press: 1992. $12.00 paper (P.O. Box 460754, San Francisco, CA94146).

Freddie Baer

Ecstatic Incisions: The Collages of Freddie Baer

Reviewer: Susan Packie

I am in awe of anyone who can create, design, and produce any book at all, let alone one as attractive as *Ecstatic Incisions*. Why Freddie Baer thinks that anyone can do what she does is beyond me. First, you have to think of it. Second, you need imagination to figure out how to proceed. Third, you need talent to pull it off. Last, you need business acumen if your creation is to end up anyplace besides in a desk drawer. I want a t-shirt, Freddie!

But why read about Freddie Baer in this publication? Why is her collage art a form of social anarchism? Her work goes beyond being pleasing to the eye, beyond illustrating the words of others, to being a sociopolitical statement in and of itself. This type of art has a long history. Think the massacre depictions of Pablo Picasso. Think the social realism of Diego Rivera. Think the pop art of Andy Warhol. Think the surreal art of Salvador Dali.

Over the centuries, art has gone from the cave to the cathedral to the museum to the poster to the public works to the postcard and, now, to the t-shirt! Freddie Baer designs a t-shirt a month for about fifty lucky people who subscribe. The t-shirts are not just pretty pictures. They make statements. The collage aspect adds a touch of irony that seems so essential to her work. Machines and watches, oppression and the tyranny of time figure prominently in the designs. Horsemen charge as politicians play the trump card. Nudes and angels crop up in incongruous places. Patterns are paramount. Death colors these black and white creations—bony fingers, skeletons, tombstones. The work can also be playful. A woman sets a butterfly free. Children blow bubbles—bubbles that become measuring devices, tiny machines. Political themes pop up on China t-shirts, a political asylum t-shirt, pro-choice (sexual preference and reproductive rights) t-shirts.

Freddie Baer's illustrations are equally provocative, enhancing the words they accompany. But she does not toe an ideological line. She is always questioning, always learning, always growing. She calls her post office box Mystopia to indicate that the future is neither a dystopia nor a utopia, but a mystery, a mystopia.

Ecstatic Incisions begins with a preface by editor-producer-teacher-author-translator Peter Lamborn Wilson, who provides an anarchist's eye view of collage. Next, Freddie Baer explains herself by answering twenty questions posed by

Thomas Murray Saté. She has the credentials. The collages that illustrate these opening sections and that make up the bulk of the book prove that she knows what to do with them—cut up, paste together in new and unexpected ways, producing a result that is far more powerful than its individual parts. Freddie Baer recreates herself, and the world.

I would like to have read a little bit about what lay behind the pictured t-shirts, just a sentence or two, and had a closer look at the collage process, unless that is a trade secret! Whatever, it works, and that is what counts.

Ecstatic Incisions: The Collages of Freddie Baer by Freddie Baer. 73 pp. San Francisco: AK Press, 1992. $11.95 paper.

Henry Rosemont, Jr

A Chinese Mirror: Moral Reflections on Political Economy and Society

Reviewer: Thomas S. Martin

This book is an expanded version of a series of articles written for *Z Magazine* and *In These Times* after Rosemont witnessed the Beijing events of June 1989. He calls it "an essay in applied comparative philosophy." This is not so tedious as it sounds. The book consists of a terse introduction followed by three longish chapters on the past, present and future state of Communist China. Between the second and third chapters we discover the book's chief contribution to radical thought: an "interlude" on "modern Western and ancient Chinese concepts of the Person."

Rosemont's central point is that Western solutions—political, economic, social—will probably not work in China, whose ancient culture is based on rather different premises. This is not shocking news, nor is his observation that the American media have judged China in recent years according to the successes and failures of Deng's free-market experiments. He is not the first or last to observe that the global ecosystem is not capable of supporting another America, which is what China is now striving to become. This attempt is digging an ever deeper chasm between the cities and the rural poor, as it generates child labor, traffic jams, and pornography, Western-style. Greed, exploitation and alienation are now as Chinese as chopsticks. The endeavor is also producing environmental devastation hard for us in the West to imagine, in spite of our Love Canals and Chernobyls.

Rosemont paints a vivid picture of a long-deprived society slavering indecorously for the consumer goods of the decadent West. Certainly we must, as Rosemont insists, reorganize our own unsustainable economy rather than encourage 1.1 billion Chinese to purchase Buicks and Big Macs. The author does not pretend to know how this can be done, and the reader must appreciate the book's lack of pontifical advice. He goes on to clarify some of the impediments to a sustained democracy movement in China—the lack of communication between students and workers, for example, and the millennia-old habit of deference to doddering rulers. The second chapter illuminates the darker corners of Deng Xiaoping's reforms and the succession struggle. In the third, Rosemont sketches a few possible future scenarios, none of them very attractive. He concludes that post-Deng China would be better off with a radically decentralized government, perhaps even an organized breakup or the secession of various regions. The idea may sound good to a Western anarchist, but is probably not realistic. Decentralization would almost certainly mean bloody conflict and "warlordism," as Rosemont admits. A return to traditional community values, low-impact technologies and intensive agriculture would undeniably be a more liberatory choice than corporate capitalism. But the obstacles are tremendous; and we have already seen enough in this century of forcing people to be free.

In the "interlude" chapter Rosemont offers a thought-provoking look at an idea that is just now beginning to catch the attention of radical philosophers. Is there really, or should there be, such a thing as "rights"? Since the concept of natural or human rights was delineated by the Enlightenment it has become a cornerstone of all liberal, socialist and even anarchist thought. We now take it for granted that people have inalienable "rights" and that the purpose of our ideology (whatever it may be) is to defend and interpret those rights. The notion that our essence as human beings lies in our individuality, rather than in our membership in the group (however defined), is the necessary corollary of rights theory. But as Rosemont points out, most people in most eras have not placed such a high value on individualism. Indigenous people the world over identify themselves primarily in terms of tribe or kinship group, as indeed Europeans did until a few centuries ago. When one derives "self-ness" from the group rather than from the physical body and consciousness, one naturally thinks more about "obligations" and "responsibilities" than about "rights." Since the days of Locke, Montesquieu and Adam Smith we have been taught to shun this archaic concept as a form of brainwashing, domination and manipulation by whatever elite that purports to speak for the group. Surely the recent experiences of Nazism, Soviet Communism and Christian fundamentalism—not to mention modern advertising— have proved the Enlightenment correct. My first priority must be me; the only alternative is robotic conformity.

But is it? At least a few theorists and activists (significantly, on both the right and left) are beginning to take a second look at the whole question of rights versus responsibilities. No doubt our greedy and destructive civilization, now in its death throes, inevitably produces Hitlers and Gingriches when it sets group obligation against individual right. There is, however, a reason for such disasters, as Rosemont astutely points out: "the conceptual framework within which rights-oriented moral and political theories find their place is fundamentally flawed." (page 60) In relatively recent times, in one small part of the world, the individual and society were dichotomized and set up in opposition to one another. Today the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights decrees that one narrow view as the standard for all humanity. To question it is to open oneself to charges of Stalinism or fascism, or worse.

Rosemont proposes a reunification of the individual and society, and suggests that Chinese tradition offers a model not only for us but for China itself as it struggles with decaying Maoism. He bases that model not on Taoism (as an anarchist might expect) but on Confucianism. In prerevolutionary China people were considered to be "individuals," but the individual was defined entirely in terms of her or his relationship to other people and to nature as a whole. Individual identity was constructed from the countless points of tangency we all have with the rest of the world. Rosemont admits that Confucianism has many drawbacks—it is hierarchic and rigid, not to mention sexist and often obsessive-compulsive. He believes that all the usual charges against Confucianism can be resolved, and that in any case its superior concepts of self-transcendence and responsibility outweigh its defects. One wonders why he does not look more seriously at Lao-tzu, whose philosophy has many of the same strengths and few of the weaknesses. Still, his fundamental point is well taken, especially in the light of the total bankruptcy of the Western, mechanistic, Cartesian definitions of individual and society.

A Chinese Mirror: Moral Reflections on Political Economy and Society by Henry Rosemont, Jr. 130 pp. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1991. $27.95 cloth. $9.95 paper.

Working on this issue

Every issue brings together an incredible passel of dedicated and talented anarchists — typing, typesetting, editing, writing, designing, filling orders, stuffing envelopes, mailing, cooking, playing music, and more. In this regular column, the editor identifies his co-conspirators, expresses his appreciation, and exposes them (in partial identity) to our readers.

a.h.s. boy designed this issue in between his romantic flights to places north while also reviewing manuscripts and consulting with the editor on matters anarchist. His web server at www.nothingness.org hosts the *SA* archives. **Dan Schechter**, acupuncturist and anarchist, screens most literary submissions, assists in the office, and provides health care to many of us. **Katie Parker** is our intern for this issue, and contributed some of the artwork. **Michael Lane, Frank Lindenfeld, Ken Wenzer,** and **Dave Westby** assisted in manuscript reviews.

Mike Long is an international Wobbly activist when not teaching linguistics in Hawaii. **Art Efron** teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in anarchism at the State University of New York at Buffalo. **Sean Burns** teaches high school and writes from Springfield, Illinois

Poets **Ellen Sander** and **Greta Harris** make their first appearance in SA. Sander works with the Los Angeles Alternative Media Network. Harris has appeared in *Semiotext(e), The Boston Globe,* and on National Public Radio among other sites.

Reviewers literary critic **Kingsley Widmer**, sociologist **Levon Chorbajian**, teacher-artist-anthropologist **Susan Packie**, and philosopher **Tom Martin** write and review regularly for us. **John Moore**, former editor of the *Bulletin of Anarchist research* and the author of *Anarchy and Ecstasy*, contributes frequently from across the Atlantic.

The symposiasts are a talented lot. **Brian Martin**, writing from Australia, last wrote for #22 a stimulating essay on democracy without elections. **Richard Kostelanetz** is a writer of fiction and nonfiction and radio and film producer working from New York City. **Jason McQuinn** is well-known as the editor of *Anarchy:*

A Journal of Desire Armed and the *Alternative Press Review*. **Joseph Heathcott**, aka Joe Average, is a writer, community activist, and labor historian living in Bloomington, Indiana. **Michael Bacon** lives and works in New Jersey where he works with the homeless and people with AIDS. **Ronald Creagh** teaches American Studies at Paul Valery University in southern France. **Neala Schleuning** is a regular contributor. Her latest book, *To Have and to Hold*, was just published this year. **Peter McGregor** lectures in media at the University of Western Sydney. His book, *Cultural Battles for the Meaning of the Viet Nam-USA War* will be published later this year.

Information for Contributors

All materials submitted are considered for publication. Manuscripts and artwork should be addressed to the editors at the address below.

Preparation of manuscripts. (a) Submit three copies. (b) Enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard for acknowledgement of receipt. (c) Manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a self-addressed envelope of appropriate size and adequate postage. (d) All copy must be typed, double spaced and pages should be numbered consecutively.

Disk copies. We prefer manuscripts on disk. Send one paper and one disk copy. Let us know the word processing program you are using.

Biographical note. Write two or three sentences (not more) about yourself.

Footnotes and notes. Use footnotes only for substantive comments, not bibliographic references. Bibliographic citations should be identified in the text by author, year, and pagination, e.g., (Bakunin, 1864, p.10). The full reference should be placed in an alphabetical list of citations following the text. It should be typed double spaced.

Illustrations. Draw with black ink on heavy white drawing paper. Submit copies, but retain the original. Photographs should have a glossy finish, with sharp contrast between black and white areas. If illustrations are accompanying text, then insert a location note in the manuscript where you want the illustration, e.g., "Place photo #1 here."

Reviews. Two copies of your work will go to two associate editors familiar with your area. They will be asked not to return the ms. The editors will forward all reviewer comments to you.

Editing. We may edit your paper. If the editing is extensive, the paper will be returned to you for your approval, correction, and retyping. Galleys or page proofs are not provided.

Reprints. Contributors will be sent three free copies of the issue in which their contribution appears.

Poetry. Poets need submit only one copy of each poem, and not more than five poems at a single time. We seldom print poems longer than two pages.

Book Reviews. The selection of books to be reviewed is made by the editors and associate editors. Persons interested in reviewing a particular work should query the editors.

Letters. The letters section provides a forum for discussion of matters of interest to our readers and comments on past articles.

Social Anarchism • 2743 Maryland Avenue • Baltimore, MD 21218 • USA
sociala@nothingness.org



Reinventing Anarchy, Again

perfect bound paperback—387 pp (6" x 9")
AK Press, Box 40682, San Francisco, CA 94149

Reinventing Anarchy, Again brings together the major currents of social anarchist theory in a collection of the most important writers from the United States, Canada, England, and Australia.

Organized in eight sections, the book opens with an exploration of the past and future possibilities of anarchism, then moves to consider the "necessity" of the state and bureaucratic organization, as well as the meaning of the "anarchist contract." The third of the theoretical sections tackles the hard questions for social anarchists confronting the foundations of libertarian socialist and liberal democratic thought.

In part four, the contributors traverse the defining characteristics of the various feminisms, moving to a concrete statement about the nature of anarcha-feminism. In the fifth section on work, the authors consider the issues of workers' self-management, resistance through the underground economy, and the implications of the abolition of work itself.

In the final three sections, the anthology addresses the culture of anarchy, self-liberation, and the process for building an anarchist society. The book ends with a set of trenchant observations on the current scene by the editor.

Contributors: Jay Amrod, George Benello, Bob Black, George Bradford, Murray Bookchin, David Bouchier, John Clark, David DeLeon, Diane di Prima, Phylis Campbell Dryden, Carol Ehrlich, Robert Graham, Charles Keil, Tom Knoche, Peggy Kornegger, Elaine Leeder, Brian Martin, Glenda Morris, Jim Murray, Ruthann Robson, Kirkpatrick Sale, Colin Ward, Susan White, Kingsley Widmer, David Wieck. Includes illustrations and collages by Freddie Baer, John Yates, and Johann Humyn Being.

Copies may be ordered from Social Anarchism using the form on the following page

Please enter my subscription to Social Anarchism. I understand that it will begin with number 25 unless I specify otherwise.

Social Anarchism

☐ $14—4 issues
☐ $16—Library Rate
(Canadian and overseas subscribers add $6.00. U.S. funds only.)

☐ Sign me up as a Social Anarchism sustainer. I enclose $50.

Back issues are available at $4.00 each.
Circle those you want.
[An index is available on request.]

1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 23

Name ______________
Address ______________
____
City ______________
State/Prov. ______________
ZIP/Postal Code ______________
Country ______________

Reinventing Anarchy, Again ______
Subscription ______
Contribution ______
Sustainership ______
Back Issues ______
Total ______

Reinventing Anarchy, Again

☐ $15—Sustainers (postpaid)
☐ $20—SA Subscribers (postpaid)
☐ $22.50—Others ($20 + $2.50 p&h)

GIVE A GIFT OF ANARCHY!

Gift Subscription Form:

Send Subscription to:
Name ______________
Address ______________
____
City ______________
State/Prov. ______________
ZIP/Postal Code ______________
Country ______________

Send to:

Social Anarchism
2743 Maryland Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21218 USA


heads are
bent down and they
stepped in red
paint or a fire is
burning their feet.

Katie Parker

Social Anarchism Number 24 $4

SOCIAL ANARCHISM 1997 NUMBER 24